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Improvement of criminal defense representation is one of the most
critical problems that faces the criminal justice system. The problem
is extensive; some attorneys are frequently ineffective and probably
all attorneys are occasionally inadequate because of error, overwork,
personal problems or ethical conflicts.'
The defendant's only remedy against his attorney's ineffectiveness
is through direct appeal or collateral post-conviction attack. This
article discusses the reasons why courts cannot improve defense rep-
resentation through these avenues of review. Deep disagreement
among judges about the purpose of post-conviction review has crip-
pled any attempt at improvement.2 The key unresolved question is
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Member of the bars of the
District of Columbia, New York and California.
I General statistics on the number of appeals alleging ineffective representation are unavaila-
ble, but a study of federal habeas corpus claims in one district court indicates that ineffective
representation heads the list of grounds for prisoner requests for relief. See Shapiro, Federal
Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv. 321, 331 (1973).
2 Compare, e.g., the majority opinion by Judge Prettyman with the dissenting opinion by
Judge Fahy in Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958).
One trial court judge has concluded, in one of the best, yet most troubled analyses of his
Circuit's search for a standard, that ineffective representation presents the most difficult issue
in criminal procedure. See Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 714 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (Oliver,
J.). See also, United States ex rel. Mandrier v. Hewitt, 409 F. Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(determining the "adequacy of pre-trial preparation ... is often. . . illusive and difficult...
where memories have dimmed . . . and no evidence exists to determine the degree of prepara-
tion").
Many reasons explain why courts are reluctant to set a high standard of representation. There
may not be enough competent attorneys to appoint to represent indigents. See Proposed
Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966: Hearings on PL 89-465 Before the Subcomm.
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whether the standard for testing an attorney's representation should
be designed simply to provide a fair verdict for the individual defen-
dant, or whether it should be designed to prod attorneys to perform
better and to encourage trial courts to police counsel's representa-
tion.
Deciding the purpose and limits of post-conviction review has
thrown the courts into turmoil. The United States Supreme Court
has eschewed its responsibility to the lower courts to fashion a consti-
tutional standard; its decisions have even complicated matters by
reducing the ways to raise the issue on appeal.4 The federal courts of
appeal differ on the proper standard to apply' and some state courts
ignore federal law.' Lower courts implore their superiors for guid-
on Const. Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. (1969) (testimony
of Chief Judge Hart of U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). Judges may fear that
a higher standard must be applied retroactively, because the attorney's effectiveness bears on
the truth-determination process. Retroactive application might require reversal of many convic-
tions on collateral attack. Judges may also not know what to require of attorneys. Questions
of ineffective representation could be divided into three parts, with different standards of review
applied to each. First, the attorney might fail to protect his client in some matter, like bail or
sentencing, that is not part of the guilt-determination process. Second, the attorney might fail
to prepare for trial by not consulting with his client, by not investigating the case, or by not
making relevant motions. Third, the attorney might make a tactical error during trial. Failures
of the first type would not warrant reversal of the conviction, but could justify disciplining the
attorney or barring him from receiving appointments. Errors of the second type are the focus
of this article. Errors of the third type would not usually require reversal; see note 36 and
accompanying text, infra.
3 What constitutes a "fair" verdict is open to interpretation. Is the verdict "fair" if it
appears to be reliable? Or, is it "fair" only if the defendant presented his best case and best
attack on the government's case?
See notes 105-116 and accompanying text, infra.
The Court is aware of the problem of ineffective representation. Chief Justice Burger has
written about the appalling ineffectiveness of many trial attorneys. See Burger, The Special
Skills of Advocacy, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973); Burger, A Sick Profession, 5 TULSA L.J.
1 (1968).
5 See notes 28-30 and accompanying text, infra. Decisions by panels within some courts of
appeal, like the Eighth Circuit, are even inconsistent. In some decisions, the circuit lested
whether the attorney's conduct was a "farce." See, e.g., Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d
222, 230 (8th Cir. 1967). In other cases, the court focused on whether the attorney was reasona-
bly competent. See. e.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 215 (8th Cir. 1974). The circuit
then welded the two tests together, defining "farce" in terms of reasonable competency, without
acknowledging that the tests were different or that the circuit's decisions were ambiguous. See
United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976). Judge Oliver painfully discusses
the history of the circuit's opinions in Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 708 (W.D. Mo.
1976) (noting use of at least four different tests).
See Berry v. Cowan, 497 F.2d 1274, 1276 (6th Cir. 1974) (Kentucky state courts criticized
for adhering to "farce" test; Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 709 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (state
courts in Eighth Circuit either ignored or disregarded Circuit's decision); Woody v. United
States, 369 A.2d 592 (D.C. 1977) (applying test rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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ance,7 and individual judges viciously criticize their colleagues.' De-
spite constant appellate review and examination by commentators,
the answers to basic questions are still unsettled.9 What sort of repre-
sentation is constitutionally required? When should the defendant's
conviction be reversed for his attorney's ineffectiveness? How does
the defendant raise the issue after his conviction? And how does he
develop the information needed to evaluate his claim?
This article uses United States v. DeCoster,'° a provocative deci-
sion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, as a window through which to observe the interplay of ten-
sions" in the attempt to answer these unsettled questions. The history
of DeCoster illustrates the uncertainty of post-conviction review. As
of this writing, DeCoster has reached the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit twice. In DeCoster I, decided in 1973, a panel remanded the case
for an evidentiary hearing on defense counsel's ineffectiveness. In
DeCoster II, decided in 1976, that panel found counsel's representa-
tion ineffective and reversed the district court's contrary finding. The
See, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 417 F.Supp. 697, 706 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (Oliver, J.). See also
Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 420 (8th Cir.) (Henley, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Oliver,
J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
1 See, e.g., MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960) (Cameron, J., dissenting),
rehearing en banc, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1961) (Hutcheson, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787, 794 (D.C. Cir.) (Fahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
1 Articles cataloging the cases include: Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 1077 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-
Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964).
Other articles include: Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: De-
partures From Habeas Corpus, 59 U. VA. L. REV. 927 (1973); Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel:
The Emerging Fair Trial Issue For The Seventies?, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19 (1975); Grano, The
Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1970); Lee,
Right to Effective Counsel A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277 (1974); Comment,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears the Burden of Proof., 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 29
(1977); Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Harmless Error Rule: The Eighth
Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1384 (1975); Note, Inadequate Represen-
tation of Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Need for a New Approach, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 166
(1974).
Influential Courts of Appeals judges have also written about the issue of ineffective represen-
tation. See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811 (1976)
[hereinafter The Realities]; Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.
1 (1973) [hereinafter Defective Assistance]; Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Quali-
fied Counsel, 61 A.B.A.J. 569 (1975); Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court, 60
A.B.A.J. 175 (1974); Tamm, Advocates can be Taught-the NITA Way, 59 A.B.A.J. 625
(1973).
10 487 F.2d 1197, (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter DeCoster 1] rehearing, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir. filed Oct. 19, 1976), [hereinafter DeCoster II], vacated March 17, 1977 (en banc), con-
solidated for en banc reconsideration with United States v. Wood, No. 73-1629 (D.C. Cir., filed
June 5, 1973) (ineffective representation claim based on attorney's alleged failure to present
insanity defense as forcefully as possible), reargued May 26, 1977.
1 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [hereinafter
"District of Columbia Circuit" is the federal court of appeals. That court is different from the
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court, sitting en banc, then vacated DeCoster II, ordered that opinion
not published, and is currently considering the appeal.
Although prediction is risky, DeCoster II will probably not survive
en banc review. Yet the DeCoster I opinion deserves review because
it provides the best approach yet fashioned to improve defense repre-
sentation through the post-conviction standard." It is also important
to analyze DeCoster because the case concerns an attorney's failure
to investigate. Of the many ways attorneys act ineffectively, the fail-
ure to investigate is the most difficult error to detect and remedy.
Inadequate investigation is rarely apparent to the judge who hears the
trial, or to the appellate court that reviews the trial transcript. Yet
the failure to investigate can devastate the defendant's ability to con-
test the government's evidence, or to present his own case.
Even if DeCoster II survives review, the decision may not improve
defense representation. It is still difficult for the defendant to raise
the issue of ineffective counsel on appeal, and to gather the evidence
necessary to win reversal at a post-conviction hearing. Post-
conviction review probably cannot force an attorney to provide effec-
tive pre-conviction representation. As a result, courts must devise
some means to prevent ineffectiveness before the verdict is an-
nounced."3
II. INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY OF THE STANDARD
AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER DEFINITION
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to define a standard to test
effective representation, preferring instead to address the problem by
persuasion and admonition." The Court trumpeted the importance of
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which is the appellate court for the local Superior
Court in the District of Columbia.
11 Whatever its outcome, the decision will be a benchmark for other courts to consider in
determining what standard to choose. See Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) (relying
on DeCoster I in rejecting "farce" test). Even if it is affirmed, DeCoster I and Ii will have
little precedential value because Congress has stripped the D.C. Circuit of habeas corpus juris-
diction over convictions from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See Swain v.
Pressley, 97 S. Ct. 1224 (1977).
"= Chief Justice Burger has appointed a committee to decide whether qualifications should
be established as a condition to practice in the federal district courts. See Devitt, Improving
Federal Trial Advocacy, 16 THE JUDGES' JOURNAL 40 (1977). Specialization and continuing
education programs are other ways to inform attorneys of their responsibilities. But none of
these approaches will assure that the attorney is carrying out his responsibilities. A way to
provide that review is suggested in Part VII of this article.
" See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53-54 (1970) (urging trial courts to appoint
counsel early, but affirming conviction even though attorney first met client on day of trial);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (noting that "if the right to counsel . . . is
to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and ...
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys," but rejecting
ineffectiveness argument when attorney's erroneous advice prompted plea).
In its 1977 term, the Court may address the issue in Holloway v. Arkansas, No. 76-5856,
[Vol. 15:109
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effective representation in Powell v. Alabama,15 where it held that the
fourteenth amendment due process clause required appointment of an
attorney in capital cases. In dictum, the Court said that this appoint-
ment had to be "effective."' 6 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
seem to hold that the Powell court was concerned about the effective-
ness of the appointment of counsel, not with that counsel's effective-
ness in defending his client. 7 Lower courts interpreted Powell nar-
rowly because they were distressed with the prospect of releasing a
convicted defendant because of his attorney's misconduct."6 Nonethe-
less, lower courts recognized that the due process clause gave some
protection to the defendant against his attorney's conduct no matter
how Powell was interpreted.' They examined whether the attorney's
skill and preparation were so horrendous that his actions created a
"farce" that rendered the defendant's conviction a "mockery of jus-
tice."2 0
In 1970, the Supreme Court, in dictum, implicitly rejected the
cert. granted, April 18, 1977, 22 Cr. L. Rptr. 4025 (1977), a case in which the attorney was
unable to convince the trial court of his conflict in representing three co-defendants. The
Supreme Court accepted certiorari even though it could have reversed summarily. See Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (showing of prejudice unnecessary when conflict in repre-
sentation apparent).
15 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11 Id. at 71. The Court noted that "the failure of the trial court to make an effective
appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (emphasis added) Appointment by the trial court of the entire defense bar of
the community to represent the "Scottsboro boys" was an ineffective appointment because it
failed to make any particular attorney responsible for representing the defendants. Id. at 56.
17 See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) (appointing attorney after indictment precluded
defendant's attack on grand jury composition); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)
(appointing one attorney to represent two co-defendants creates potential conflict of interest);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (trial court's refusal to grant continuance did not
deprive defendant of effective assistance).
11 See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 789-91 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that Powell
required counsel have an opportunity to prepare but did not require review of counsel's skill),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.) (allegation that
attorney gave bad advice due to negligence or ignorance insufficient to require hearing), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
It See, e.g., United States v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1967); United States ex
rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir. 1953) (Marris, J., concurring); Diggs v. Welch,
148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
" First announced in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 358 U.S.
859 (1958), the farce test may have been derived from the Supreme Court's disapproval of
"sham" proceedings in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). Cases from every circuit
using the "farce" test are collected in Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears
The Burden of Proof7, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 32 n. 25 (1977) (hereinafter Ineffective Assis-
tance). The "farce" test demands so little of counsel that it has been criticized as a mockery
itself. Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 9 at 28. Courts have rejected a more rigorous
standard because the attorney was viewed as his client's agent. This justification has been
generally rejected. See Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975); Craig, The Right to
Adequate Representation in the Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 S.W.L.J. 260, 272
(1968).
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"farce and mockery" test by suggesting that the sixth amendment
required examination of the defense attorney's actual performance.
In McMann v. Richardson,"' the defendant claimed that he pleaded
guilty because of erroneous advice from his attorney that his confes-
sion was admissible. The Court held that the guilty plea barred appel-
late review of counsel's judgment unless the plea had not been made
intelligently. The standard was whether the attorney's advice, even if
wrong, was "reasonably competent" and "within the range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.""2 Although the Court
has had opportunities to refine the standard, it has declined such
invitations,2 dismissed ineffectiveness issues,24 or avoided full review
of the issue.?'
The ramifications of other Supreme Court decisions underscore the
need to define and ensure effective representation .2  The Court has
drastically restricted the availability of federal habeas corpus review
21 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
22 Id. at 770-71. Accord, Toilette v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 264 (1973).
2 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169 (3d Cir,) (reversing
district court finding of ineffectiveness when defense attorney failed to find important defense
witness and improperly advised client about prior convictions), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997
(1976). In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court refused to define when an
attorney should be appointed and affirmed the Third Circuit's conclusion that the defendant
failed to demonstrate how belated appointment negatively affected the quality of representa-
tion. In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to explore
the attorney's preparation. Id. at 59-60. The Court's unwillingness to review issues of ineffec-
tiveness is clear from its comment in McMann that "[Wle think the matter [of effective
representation] . . . should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts ....
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
2, See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1976) (explicitly holding for first
time counsel's conduct not ineffective but without defining standard of review).
1 The Court has been helped by attorneys who never debated effectiveness or who dropped
that claim and relied on other substantive issues. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497
(1977) (appellate counsel conceded competency of trial attorney who failed to challenge defen-
dant's confession in federal habeas suit to avoid dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies;
issue had not been raised in state courts); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (issue
presented to District of Columbia Circuit but not argued before Supreme Court); Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (appellate counsel dropped issue as alternative ground). Cf.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977) (overlooking possible ineffectiveness claim when
counsel failed to object to photo or in-court identification); Henderson v. Kibbe, 97 S.Ct. 1730
(1977) (overlooking possible ineffective representation claim based on attorney's failure to
request jury instruction on causation); Gardner v. Florida, 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977) (overlooking
possible ineffectiveness claim when attorney failed to request pre-sentence report used to im-
pose death penalty); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (overlooking possible ineffec-
tiveness claim when attorney failed to challenge grand jury's composition).
2 For example, the Court has increased the importance of the attorney's decision to demand
discovery by narrowly defining the government's constitutional duty to disclose unrequested
information to the defense. See generally United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). By
expanding the scope of discovery for the prosecution, the Court has also increased the import-




to test the constitutionality of governmental conduct." Failure by an
attorney to make a timely objection can bar his client's attack on the
government's action in any court. It is important, therefore, to define
the attorney's responsibility, both to protect his client and to protect
the Court's goal of limiting habeas corpus review.
The federal courts have not handled the responsibility given them
by the Supreme Court in a consistent manner. A few retain the
"farce" test despite the dictum in McMann.2 ' Some courts claim that
the term "farce" has significance only as a literary metaphor which
describes the defendant's "heavy burden."'" And others, like the
DeCoster court, have extended the McMann tests to cover what they
see as the full scope of the problem. 0
The "farce" test is inappropriate if not unconstitutional.
McMann's "reasonable competency" test, by definition, requires rep-
resentation that is better than a "farce."'" The appropriate test must
clearly describe the analysis demanded of the reviewing court,
thereby helping courts decide whether a hearing is necessary to air
27 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); notes 107-116 and accompanying text infra.
" First Circuit: United States v. Benthiem, 456 F.2d 165, 167 (1st Cir. 1972). But cf Dunker
v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1974) (attorney was effective under either "farce" or
stricter test), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003 (1975).
Second Circuit: United States v. Joyce, 542 F.2d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Yanishevsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
Fourth Circuit: Bennett v. Maryland, 425 F.2d 181 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 881
(1970).
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Larsen, 525 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1075 (1976); Lorraine v. United States, 444 F.2d I, 2 (10th Cir. 1971).
" See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976);
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974), modified, 537 F.2d 976 (1976).
" DeCoster 1, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1202 ("a defendant is entitled to the reasonably
competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate").
Third Circuit: Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("The exercise of
the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place").
Fourth Circuit: Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.) (announcing specific guidelines
similar to DeCoster), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). But see Bennett v. Maryland, 425 F.2d
181, 182 (4th Cir.) (reverting to the farce standard while ignoring Coles), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
881 (1970).
Fifth Circuit: MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960) ("counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance").
Sixth Circuit: Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("reasonably likely
to render and rendering effective assistance").
Seventh Circuit: United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.)
("legal assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation"), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 876 (1975).
"' The McMann standard, 397 U.S. at 770-771, grounded in the sixth amendment, requires
a higher degree of advocacy than the farce standard, which is based on the due process clause.
See United States v. Smith 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407,
411 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 722 (5th
Cir. 1976); Garton v. Swenson, 417 F.Supp. 697, 706 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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the defendant's challenge. An explicit standard would help the parties
present the relevant evidence needed to review the claim,32 and might
reduce the number of federal habeas corpus claims. 33 It certainly
would reduce the time and expense necessary to litigate issues of
ineffective representation. 3'
Uncertainty regarding the purpose of the test is the greatest stum-
bling block to easy review. Courts that focus on the fairness of the
verdict, rather than on the attorney's conduct, make a visceral judg-
ment of the possible effect of the attorney's failings on the verdict.
31
But if the goal of the courts is to improve representation, the path is
more difficult. Courts understandably do not want to second-guess
the tactical decisions made by trial counsel, unless his decisions were
obviously inept.3' They are satisfied if the trial attorney has made
informed tactical decisions for his client. 37 The standard of represen-
22 See United States ex rel. Greene v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970) (mistakenly
believing "farce" test applied, neither party introduced evidence relevant to a determination
under the salient "reasonable competency" test). Appellate counsel must understand his burden
so that he is not attacked as ineffective. See Founts v. Pogue, 532 F.2d 1232, 1234 n.40 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976); United States ex rel. Mandrier v. Hewitt, 409 F. Supp.
38, 46 (W.D. Pa. 1976). Appellate counsel runs other risks as well. See United States v. Hurt,
543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trial attorney's two million dollar action against appellate
counsel for instituting ineffectiveness charge dismissed, but case remanded for second eviden-
tiary hearing because appellate counsel might have been ineffective).
3 On habeas corpus review, the federal district court may not defer to the state court on
the constitutional issue of effective representation if the state used the wrong standard. Wolfs
v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1974). If the state court used the wrong standard, the
federal district court probably must hold a new evidentiary hearing because the facts will not
have been adequately developed previously. See Founts v. Pogue, 532 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976); Franklin v. Wyrick, 529 F.2d 79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
962 (1976). For a review of the problem confronting federal courts in determining what test
the state court has applied, see Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 718 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
"' For example, McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d Ill (Mo. 1972), wound its way from the
state appellate system to the federal district court on habeas review, McQueen v. Swenson, 357
F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Mo. 1973), to the Eighth Circuit, which remanded for further factual
determinations, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974). The district court's remand to the state court
was appealed to the Eighth Circuit, United States ex rel. McQueen v. Wangelis, 527 F.2d 579
(8th Cir. 1975), where the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision, but then, on
rehearing, ordered the district court to make the factual determinations previously ordered. #76-
1163 (8th Cir. July 14, 1976).
" Clearly, an attorney is not ineffective simply because his client is found guilty. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 705 (5th Cir. 1965).
" See DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 15 n.25 (no reversal when attorney made
informed judgment unless "manifestly unreasonable"); United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d
473, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("reversal should never be based upon good faith tactics of defense
except upon clearest proof of actual prejudice"); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 117 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (refusing to second-guess trial attorney on "questions of strategy, trial tactics
or trial decisions"). But if the totality of tactical error by the attorney is great, courts may
reverse. See United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
" An attorney may decide not to use a witness, but he must get the information necessary
to make that decision. See Salazar v. Estelle, 547 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
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tation used should force the trial attorney to get the legal and factual
information he needs to appreciate the decisions he must make. 38
At a minimum, the standard should oblige the attorney to do three
things: consult with his client, investigate both the law and facts, and
make all motions necessary to preserve any issue for appeal. Investi-
gation is the most crucial because it helps the attorney decide whether
to file motions, how to attack the government's evidence, and how
to present his client's case. When the attorney fails to follow some
investigative lead, this failure might be shown at the post-conviction
hearing if the defendant can produce uninvestigated evidence that
could have provided important information .3 Cases like DeCoster,
however, present a more difficult situation, because it is impossible
to determine, what, if any, information the attorney might have dis-
covered through timely investigation, how the defendant might have
used that information, and how that information might have affected
the outcome of the case.
III. UNITED STATES v. DECOSTER
A. DeCoster 140
A jury convicted Willie DeCoster of assault with a dangerous
weapon and aiding and abetting two accomplices in an armed rob-
bery. Two police officers witnessed the robbery. One officer testified
that he chased DeCoster into a nearby hotel, and that he arrested
DeCoster as he stood near the lobby desk. The victim identified
DeCoster immediately after his arrest, but was unable to do so at the
trial because his eyesight was impaired by an intervening auto acci-
dent.
At his trial, DeCoster denied robbing the victim, but admitted he
had been drinking with the victim earlier in a bar near the parking
lot where the robbery occurred. At DeCoster's insistence, his attorney
called Fred Eley, one of the two alleged accomplices, as a witness.
Eley contradicted DeCoster's story and testified that he had seen the
defendant fighting with the victim. On appeal, the defendant did not
v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The question is not whether counsel would
have done better by different choices, but only whether his trial decisions were informed,
deliberate and rational.").
11 See DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 12; Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166,
182-83 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (the best lawyer in the world cannot provide effective representation
without the facts.); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTION, Commentary 224-25 (App. Draft 1971).
11 Courts have long reversed when the defendant has established that his attorney did not
investigate helpful witnesses known to exist. See, e.g., Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C.
Cir. 1945) (using "farce and mockery" test).
1* DeCoster 1, supra note 10.
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raise the issue of ineffective representation, but Chief Judge Bazelon,
writing for the majority, sensed the issue's presence.4 The panel re-
manded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
attorney had been ineffective; if the attorney were found ineffective,
the lower court was ordered to grant a new trial. Bazelon was particu-
larly concerned with the attorney's apparent lack of preparation, his
decision to call Eley as a witness, and his failure to interview the
government's witnesses and the defendant's two accomplices."
To guide the court on remand, Bazelon stated that a defendant is
entitled to "the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting
as his diligent conscientious advocate. '4 3 Bazelon pointed out that
the American Bar Association's Standards for the Defense Function
helped define this "short-hand label."" In general, a defense attorney
should investigate the law and the facts of both his own case and that
of the government.45 If the attorney violates these duties substan-
tially," the defendant is entitled to a reversal, unless the government
11 DeCoster I was not the first time Chief Judge Bazelon raised the issue when it had not
been raised by the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
United States v. Simpson, 475 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); cf. United
States v. Patterson, 495 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (ineffective representation may exist when attorney fails to discover govern-
ment evidence favorable to the defendant).
,2 Bazelon was also concerned by the attorney's belated filing for bail review and his initial
willingness to try the case without a jury to the same judge before whom DeCoster's alleged
accomplices had pleaded guilty. (The government refused to waive a jury, and a jury ultimately
convicted DeCoster.) The trial attorney's failure to interview at the hotel or bar did not surface
until the evidentiary hearing.
' DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1202.
" Id. at 1203. Bazelon later claimed that the ABA standards were already the law and simply
constituted a convenient checklist. See United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 488 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). DeCoster I paraphrased Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,
226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968), apparently the first case that adopted the ABA
standards. The duties counsel owes his client include:
Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as often as necessary to
elicit matters of defense, or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable.
Counsel should discuss fully potential strategies and tactical choices with his client.
Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and take all actions neces-
sary to preserve them. Many rights can only be protected by prompt legal action
Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to deter-
mine what matters of defense can be developed . . . . This means that in most cases
a defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses but also
those that the government intends to call, when they are accessible. The investigation
should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecu-
tion and law enforcement authorities. And, of course, the duty to investigate also
requires adaquate legal research.
DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1203-04 (citations omitted).
' DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1204.
AS The term "substantial" was not defined until DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 19-
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can demonstrate that the defendant suffered no prejudice and that the
violation was therefore harmless error.47
Judge MacKinnon dissented in part. He did not disagree with the
use of the ABA guidelines, but thought that the government should
not have to prove the absence of prejudice." He argued that the
defendant held the burden of proving that failure to investigate had
prejudiced his case, on the assumption that the defendant had better
access to information that his attorney had not investigated.49
B. The Evidentiary Hearing
DeCoster l's explanation of the standard was not particularly help-
ful on remand, because it did not indicate the specific evidence that
the parties should develop. Judge Waddy, presiding at the remand
hearing, thought that the defendant had the burden of going for-
ward. 0 But DeCoster's appellate counsel claimed that the trial record
sufficiently indicated the bases of ineffectiveness,"' despite DeCoster
I's direction to the defendant to present evidence on that issue. 2 The
government called the trial attorney as its only witness.5" The attor-
ney remembered very little of the trial since it had ended almost three
years earlier, and he claimed he was no longer able to "pinpoint" the
particular case.54 On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had
not interviewed the victim, the police officers, the accomplice who did
not testify, or anyone at the bar or hotel.55 The attorney claimed to
have interviewed Eley once, immediately before Eley testified, but did
not remember what Eley had told him, and felt that he would not
have put Eley on the stand without knowing what he would say. He
believed that he had no reason to interview the police because they
claimed to have seen DeCoster from the moment of the robbery until
he was arrested. Finally, the attorney tried to justify his failure to
interview one accomplice and his belated interview of Eley by refer-
ring to a letter that he had received from his client on the morning
of the trial. In that letter, DeCoster admitted, apparently for the first
,7 DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1204.
,8 Id. at 1205. (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49 Id.
50 Record of remand hearing at 5 (February 6, 1974) [hereinafter Record]. Judge Waddy also
presided at the jury trial.
51 Id. The attorney whose representation was challenged [hereinafter "trial attorney"] was
replaced by another attorney [hereinafter "appellate counsel"] who was appointed for Dc-
Coster's direct appeal and also represented him at the remand hearing.
" DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1204.
" The government did not dispute whether the defendant had met his initial burden of going
forward. Record, supra note 50, at 13-14.
Record, supra note 50, at 20.
Id. at 32-44.
19771
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
time, that he had fought with the victim and that the accomplices had
been with him, but reiterated that he had neither assaulted nor robbed
the victim. 6
Appellate counsel called DeCoster to establish that he had been
with Eley just before Eley testified, and that he had not seen the trial
attorney interview Eley.57 On direct examination, DeCoster was not
asked about the incident itself and he never claimed to be innocent.
On cross-examination, the government asked him to explain the in-
consistency between his trial testimony and the letter.58 DeCoster
equivocated, first claiming not to remember his trial testimony and
then asserting that he had lied in the letter to spur his attorney to visit
him.59 DeCoster admitted that he knew no one at the bar who could
testify for him.6 0 Although he insisted that he had asked his trial
attorney to interview the hotel manager, he never explained what the
manager might have said or how his testimony would have aided his
defense." Appellate counsel also called Eley, who contradicted the
trial attorney's testimony by saying that he had never been inter-
viewed."
On this record, appellate counsel was unable to explain how inves-
tigation might have helped DeCoster or what prejudice DeCoster had
suffered, except tonote that no one would ever know the answers to
these questions.63 At the hearing, appellate counsel debated what the
trial attorney should have done when confronted with DeCoster's
inconsistent stories. 4 This issue was largely irrelevant since it did not
explain why the trial attorney had not investigated before receiving
DeCoster's letter.
Judge Waddy denied the motion for a new trial, holding that the
only way to have represented DeCoster vas to argue that the govern-
" DeCoster had also written to Judge Waddy in early November, 1970, that he was guilty
only of "assault by self-defence." DeCoster 11, supra note 10, slip op. at 24 n.7 (dissent).
Neither the trial attorney nor the government knew of this letter to Judge Waddy before the
remand hearing. The trial attorney's reaction to DeCoster's startling admissions was never
explored at the hearing.
St Record, supra note 50, at 62.
Id. at 68. This line of inquiry was arguably irrelevant since it shifted the focus from the
attorney's conduct to a relitigation of the defendant's guilt.
I ld. at 69, 70-71.
" Id. at 71.
I Id. at 71-72.
2 Id. at 92-93. Eley testified that he did not know why he had been brought from jail to
court until he was called to testify, even though he had been transported from jail with DeCos-
ter. Judge Waddy questioned the credibility of this testimony. Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on Remand at 14 (April 23, 1974) [hereinafter Remand findings].
13 Id. at 100, 112, 119-20. Appellate counsel also had not attempted to investigate to see if
any witnesses might have been found. Oral argument, May 26, 1977.
1, Record, supra note 50, at 99-100 (Feb. 13, 1974).
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ment had not carried its burden of proofA5 Although counsel had been
"lax in his duty to conduct as thorough a factual investigation as
might have been possible," that failure was not a "substantial viola-
tion" as defined in DeCoster 1L"
The evidentiary hearing left many questions unanswered. What
had DeCoster first told his attorney? Was DeCoster's letter to his
attorney his first admission that he had fought with the victim? If so,
why had the attorney not searched for witnesses at the bar and hotel
before he received the letter? And, how did the attorney determine
which "story" was the truth?
C. DeCoster II
In a split decision, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Judge
Waddy's denial and granted the motion for a new trial.17 In this
second analysis, Chief Judge Bazelon breathed meaning into the
three-part test of DeCoster I. The duty to investigate required the
attorney to investigate all facets of the case, no matter what his client
had told him. 8 Analyzing only the record of the evidentiary hearing,
Bazelon felt that the trial attorney had done minimal investigation
at best, and that his reasons for not investigating further were unper-
suasive. 9 Bazelon concluded that the attorney had failed to investi-
gate, even though no one had shown that witnesses might have been
found, that the attorney would have used them, or that these wit-
nesses would have helped the defense or brought about a different
verdict .70
Next, Bazelon held that a "substantial" failure to investigate was
"consequential" ' 7' if that failure affected the defendant's presentation
of his case. The defendant did not need to show that but for the lack
of investigation, the jury might have acquitted him. Instead, he only
had to demonstrate that he could have better evaluated his own case
or the case of the government had his attorney conducted an investi-
95 Remand findings, supra note 62, at 19. In effect, Judge Waddy concluded that DeCoster's
denial was a lie. Thus, the trial attorney had not been obligated to investigate at the hotel or
bar. Id. at 18.
" Id. at 19. Judge Waddy reviewed the entire record and found that counsel's failures had
not prejudiced the defense. Id. at 20. In effect, Judge Waddy found the attorney's omissions to
be harmless error.
'7 DeCoster I1, supra note 10, No. 72-1283.
I5 d. at 13.
" Id. at 16-19.
10 Id. at 19.
" Id. at 20. The term "consequential" first appeared in United States v. Pinckney, 543 F.2d
908, 917 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (counsel's failure to challenge government assertions in allocu-
tion memorandum that linked defendant with narcotics trafficking was "inconsequential" be-
cause defendant did not indicate evidence that would have refuted assertion).
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gation 72 Bazelon held that the trial attorney's "total failure to investi-
gate" was so inherently prejudicial that adverse consequences could
be presumed.7" Bazelon presumed that any further investigation
would have produced useful evidence for the defense.74 Even if investi-
gation had not uncovered a "scintilla of evidence," investigation
might have helped the defendant assess the advantage of seeking a
plea bargain, which was a possible ineffectiveness ground that the
defendant had not raised at the evidentiary hearing.75
This presumption satisfied DeCoster's burden, excused his obliga-
tion to produce evidence of adverse consequences, and shifted the
burden to show the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt
to the government.7" Ordinarily, the government would have a good
chance to establish harmless error by comparing the evidence that the
defendant might have presented with the evidence actually introduced
at the trial.77 But Bazelon admitted that in cases like DeCoster the
attorney's failure to investigate precluded any evaluation of the omit-
ted evidence. The government could not satisfy its burden easily.7"
And since the government had not tried to show that the failure to
investigate did not affect the defense or the verdict, the appellate
court reversed DeCoster's conviction.79
In a blistering dissent, Judge MacKinnon insisted that the reliabil-
72 DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 19.
11 Id. at 20-22. The cases cited by Bazelon do not support this argument. Bazelon thought
the failure to investigate was loaded with likely prejudice and could be equated to the late
appointment of an attorney. Id. at 21 & n.33. But in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53-
54 (1970), the Supreme Court refused to apply a per se rule whenever counsel was appointed
late, and denied relief because the defendant had not shown what his attorney might have done
had he been appointed earlier. Bazelon also sought support from Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d
224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968), the first case that, in paraphrasing the
ABA guidelines, had established counsel's responsibility to investigate. There, two appointed
attorneys had been extraordinarily overworked, and pressures imposed by the trial court inter-
fered with their performance. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has apparently retreated from
Coles. See Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089 (4th Cir. 1970) (denying challenge without citing
Coles, because defendant had not shown what defense an unsubpoenaed witness would have
provided).
7, DeCoster 11, supra note 10, slip op. at 22.
71 Id. at 22-23. Cf. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 554 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (implying that trial attorney might have been incompetent-in not plea bargaining because
codefendants pleaded guilty and received eight-year prison terms and defendant went to trial,
was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment).
76 DeCoster I1, supra note 10, slip op. at 23-24.
1 Id. at 24-25. But see United States v. Lucas. 513 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(government
failed to show attorney's failure to interview defense witness was harmless error).
7A DeCoster I1, supra note 10, slip op. at 25.
71 Id. This misread the record. The prosecution had reviewed the government's evidence and
argued that no prejudice flowed from the trial attorney's failures. Record, supra note 50, at
14-15.
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ity of the verdict was the key issue. 0 This view freed him to consider
materials beyond the hearing8' and prompted his disagreement over
the attorney's duty to investigate and the defendant's burden to estab-
lish harm. MacKinnon believed that DeCoster was guilty, not simply
because he was found guilty, but because of DeCoster's written ad-
mission to his attorney and a statement he had made at his sentenc-
ing.8 2
MacKinnon agreed that the ABA standards were useful, but he
viewed them only as guidelines whose violation did not necessarily
constitute ineffective representation.8 MacKinnon argued that an
attorney must have the discretion to decide when to stop investigating
and should be able to do so if he reasonably believes his client is
guilty. MacKinnon concluded that once the trial attorney had re-
ceived DeCoster's letter, he was justified in not investigating further. 4
No attorney is obligated to search to support a fabricated defense,
MacKinnon said. MacKinnon also argued that failure to investigate
did not, by itself, constitute ineffective representation. The defendant
must still establish that this failure caused him "actual prejudice." '
MacKinnon defined "actual prejudice" as proof that a timely investi-
gation would have uncovered "fruitful evidence . . . that would
[have] create[ld a reasonable doubt of guilt."8" MacKinnon also re-
jected any presumption of harm because he felt that the defendant
had better access to the omitted information.87
D. The Purpose and Scope of DeCoster II
DeCoster I recognizes that the defendant must prove ineffective-
ness, but breaks new ground with its definition of the defendant's
burden and its analysis of how the defendant can meet the burden.
No other decision defines the defendant's burden so favorably and no
' DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 71 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 15 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Because DeCoster's trial counsel had also repre-
sented Taylor, the second alleged accomplice, at the preliminary hearing for all three defen-
dants, MacKinnon assumed that counsel knew of Taylor's version of the incident. MacKinnon
also assumed that counsel would have learned of Eley's version through conversations with him
or his attorney. If MacKinnon is correct, then the trial attorney's decision to call Eley as a
witness seems incomprehensible. He should have known that Eley would contradict DeCoster.
11 Id. at 23. At sentencing, DeCoster said he wanted to be rehabilitated and did not assert
his innocence. Judge MacKinnon probably read too much into DeCoster's statement. Few
defendants assert their innocence at sentencing, because they fear the judge will give them a
harsher sentence if they fail to accept responsibility and express remorse.
Id. at 41.
, Id. at II. MacKinnon did not explain how an attorney reaches that decision, and his
argument invites the trial attorney to give his opinion of the defendant's guilt at the hearing.
u Id. at 50.
I ld. at 41 (emphasis omitted).
11 Id. at 58.
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other decision uses a presumption to excuse the defendant's inability
to present the evidence that his attorney failed to find.-"
Not many courts will adopt DeCoster II, whether or not it survives
en banc reconsideration. Although courts recognize the need for im-
proved defense representation, they often hesitate to attack ineffec-
tive representation when the only remedy is to reverse the conviction.
The judgment in DeCoster II may alarm many courts because any
fair analysis of the facts indicates that the defendant was guilty. 9
The DeCoster court could have affirmed the conviction, if it had
not used the presumption or if it had held that the attorney's errors
were harmless. That result would not have disturbed the three-step
analysis or prevented the use of the presumption in an appropriate
case. Yet the majority perhaps believed that reversal was necessary
to achieve the decision's apparent purpose of providing a prophylactic
standard to prevent ineffective representation 0 By defining counsel's
responsibilities, the decision should educate attorneys. By defining
the defendant's burden solow, the decision indirectly pressures trial
attorneys to perform better to avoid the onus of being found ineffec-
tive, and pressures trial courts to devise some way to assure that
counsel provides effective representation in order to protect verdicts
from post-conviction attack.
DeCoster II presents crucialquestions. Does the sixth amendment
require what the DeCoster court apparently hopes to achieve? Even
if the decision is constitutionally justifiable, will it actually improve
defense representation?
In considering these questions, it is important to note the limits of
DeCoster IL First, while the three-step analysis applies to all cases,
the presumption only applies when no one knows what evidence the
investigation missed. In most cases, when the attorney does not inves-
tigate specific potential witnesses, the defendant must produce those
witnesses at the hearing for the court to assess how they might have
u Other courts, for example, have summarily dismissed claims of total failure to investigate
where there was no indication of what investigation would have produced. See note 226, infra.
Even DeCoster II does not indicate whether a general allegation of ineffectiveness would
suffice.
"1 A better factual case would have involved the attorney's failure to investigate witnesses
named by the defendant who subsequently testify at the evidentiary hearing. If these witnesses
testify, some courts have had less trouble finding counsel's representation ineffective. See
United States v. Lucas, 513 F.2d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(motion for new trial granted when
counsel had not interviewed eyewitness).
" While this is not apparent from the DeCoster 1I opinion, Bazelon had noted that the threat
of reversal will have a prophylactic effect by encouraging trial courts and prosecutors to try to
prevent ineffectiveness, by reducing the likelihood that incompetent attorneys will receive ap-
pointments, and by inducing unprepared attorneys to refuse to go to trial. Bazelon, The Reali-
ties, supra note 9 at 822 n.51; Defective Assistance, supra note 9 at 31.
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helped the defense. 91
Second, DeCoster II is limited solely to direct appeals and does not
apply to collateral attack where the defendant's burden is much
greater." On collateral attack, the defendant must prove that his
attorney was grossly incompetent, as measured by wliether the attor-
ney had "in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense;"
moreover, the defendant must also claim that he was innocent in
order to establish prejudice. 3
This distinction between collateral and direct review makes sense
only as a way to limit the retroactive application of DeCoster 11.94
The defendant will not ordinarily be able to raise the issue on direct
appeal because the trial transcript does not usually reveal the way in
which the attorney acted ineffectively. To accommodate this di-
lemma, the DeCoster court created a way to amplify the record on
direct appeal by permitting the defendant to raise the issue initially
through a motion for new trial.95 DeCoster I and I! can be viewed as
a package that must be accepted in its entirety in order to accomplish
Chief Judge Bazelon's goal and still not burden the government un-
fairly. But these limitations on the application of the decision also
illustrate how difficult it is to prevent ineffective representation
through any post-conviction standard.
IV. WHAT DOES "EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION" MEAN?
To assess claims of ineffective representation, courts must interpret
McMann v. Richardson's standard of the "range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases."' 7 As stated, that standard is
too broad to provide any practical guidance.
" See DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 22 n.36.
I2 d. at 9; See United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 931, 932 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf.
Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137, 1140 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1974) (suggesting, without deciding, that
constitutional standard on collateral appeal may be greater).
11 In Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the defendant collater-
ally attacked his guilty plea based on his attorney's alleged erroneous advice about the elements
of the crime. The court found the attorney's advice justified by the facts of the case. Moreover,
since the defendant had not testified at the hearing and had made only a "bare assertion of
innocence," the court found that he had not established prejudice. Id. at 121. Bruce indicates
that if a defendant has pleaded guilty, he must testify at the hearing that he was in fact innocent.
'1 The retroactive application of DeCoster is the two year time period within which to move
for a new trial. See United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (majority held
DeCoster applicable but found counsel effective).
"s See notes 210-216 and accompanying text infra.
"a The fear is that the government cannot retry the defendant. Cf. United States v. Butler,
504 F.2d 220, 223 n.I I (D.C. Cir. 1974) (retroactive application of DeCoster would not overly
disrupt administration of justice because of limitation to direct appeal).
97 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
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In attempting to define McMann's standard, courts might take
judicial notice of current legal practices, call experts to comment on
an attorney's performance in a particular case, or adopt some specific
definition of the obligations that attorneys owe their clients. None of
these approaches will improve defense representation significantly or
help courts decide whether the attorney was effective.
Judicial notice does not dictate a standard for lower courts to
follow;98 their decisions may be as arbitrary as those permitted by the
"farce" standard.9 Nor does it tell attorneys what is expected of
them. And, judicial notice is difficult to use when a defendant attacks
an old conviction collaterally. Should reasonable competence be de-
termined by legal practices that prevail at the time of the appeal or
at the time of the trial?N
Few courts will admit expert testimony because they can take judi-
cial notice of the accepted standard within their jurisdiction.'0' Also,
it will be difficult to find attorneys who are willing to evaluate their
colleagues, or to decide what qualifies anyone to be an expert on
effective representation.102
By adopting the ABA guidelines, 03 DeCoster takes the most use-
" It is also difficult for a federal court on collateral attack to decide what the prevailing
practice in a state is. See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 413 n. 6 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 868 (1976). But judicial notice would allow a court to shift its expectations of what
counsel should do. Cf United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) (effective
representation is an "evolving concept") (Henley, J., concurring).
11 The judge's evaluation of the attorney's representation is a function of his own experience.
In Matthews v. United States, 449 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1971), counsel's representation was first
found effective, but then ineffective on rehearing after the court discovered that another panel
had previously found a similar final argument given by the same attorney ineffective. See also
United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("farce and mockery" due process
test). Courts have permitted questionable representation to pass as "normal competency." See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (attorney not
ineffective when he reviewed Defender Association file, conducted some investigation, first met
client minutes before the trial, which was his 39th of the week, cross-examined government
witnesses badly, and gave no summation).
I0 In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 269 (1973), the Supreme Court implied that the
relevant date was the date of the conviction rather than the appeal. The Court, although
suggesting that when the defendant pleaded guilty in 1948 a Tennessee trial attorney would not
have questioned the racial composition of grand juries, remanded on that issue.
',' But, expert testimony may be persuasive. See Pinnell v. Cauthron, 540 F.2d 938 (8th Cir.
1976) (co-defendant's attorney testified that defendant's attorney had done very little to help
this defendant; conviction reversed for ineffective representation); Williams v. Beto, 364 F.
Supp. 335, 338-39 (S.D. Texas 1973) (prosecutor at post-conviction hearing testified that, like
defense counsel, he would not have called defendant as a witness).
"0 And how would an attorney reach his opinion, assuming he were qualified? Would he
listen to the testimony at the hearing? Would he review the case files? Cf Jones v. Huff, 152
F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (trial court asked prominent attorney to act as master and review
defendant's allegations, but attorney's conclusion that no basis for relief existed was reversed
to force trial court to decide effectiveness issue).
'1* The particular guidelines in question are: section 3.2 (consultation with the client); sec-
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ful approach. In considering whether to adopt the guidelines,'10 other
courts must decide several questions. Will the guidelines help, given
the variety of reasons for ineffective representation? Do the guidelines
give enough direction to the attorney without denying him the discre-
tion to decide not to do something? Are the guidelines specific enough
so that attorneys and courts can interpret their commands easily?
A. Will Adopting the Guidelines Help?
The guidelines have several obvious benefits. They educate attor-
neys, inform the parties about the evidence needed at a post-
conviction hearing, and provide courts with a framework to assess the
attorney's conduct.
Of the three guidelines, the duty to protect the record may help
improve defense representation the most. Most attorneys recognize
that consultation and investigation are indispensable. Without them,
the attorney cannot know his client's position, or how to present that
position most effectively. But attorneys frequently fail to appreciate
how important motions can be. A hearing on a motion to suppress
evidence, for example, can be an invaluable source of information
even if it is denied. That hearing might persuade an uncooperative
client to plea bargain by showing him the strength of the govern-
ment's case. That hearing might help the attorney discover other
leads, or develop information to impeach a witness later at trial.
Attorneys may also not recognize that the failure to object to some
government action may bar the defendant from receiving review by
tion 3.6 (protection of the record); and section 4.1 (investigation). See ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, (App. Draft, 1971) (hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS).
The ABA did not intend its standards to be the test for ineffective representation:
These standards are intended as guides for conduct of lawyers and as the basis for
disciplinary action, not as criteria for judicial evaluation of the effectiveness of
counsel to determine the validity of a conviction; they may or may not be relevant
in such judicial evaluation of the effectiveness of counsel, depending upon all the
circumstances.
Id., § 1.1 (f) at 154.
I" Opinions other than DeCoster that have adopted the guidelines include: State v. Tucker,
97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975). Opinions that
have noted the guidelines without adopting them include: Brescia v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921,
924 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (mentions investigation guideline); Thomas v. Wyrick,
535 F.2d 407, 413 n.6 (8th Cir.) (mentions guidelines for adequate preparation), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 868 (1976); Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304, 310 (8th Cir. 1975) (cites guideline on
need to investigate); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216 n.12 (8th Cir. 1974) (guidelines
are "highly respected" but not adopted); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.) (anticipates
later guidelines); cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 741
(3d Cir. 1970) (Van Dusen, 3., concurring) (suggests ABA standards be used to define federal
standard); Garton v. Swenson, 367 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 n.5 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (mentions ABA
guidelines).
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any court of the constitutionality of that conduct. The defendant is
barred from raising an issue for. the first time on federal habeas
corpus where his attorney had, for tactical reasons, deliberately by-
passed an objection at trial,0 5 or where an adequate, non-federal state
ground existed to justify denial of relief.'0 6 But in recent decisions, the
Supreme Court has dramatically raised the barriers to federal habeas
review. In the process, the Court has increased the importance of
counsel's recognition that he must make objections in order to protect
the record for appeal. In Estelle v. Williams, the Court held that no
constitutional violation had occurred because counsel had not ob-
jected to the jail clothes worn by his client at trial.0 7 Without coun-
sel's objection, the trial court could assume that counsel had made a
tactical decision about the jail clothes, and the trial court had there-
fore not "compelled" the defendant to wear them.'10 Francis v.
Henderson'" and Wainwright v. Sykes" ° involved the "adequate state
ground" bar to federal habeas review. In each case trial counsel had
failed to follow a state procedural rule that required that an objection
be made pre-trial. In Francis, counsel had not objected to the compo-
sition of the grand jury that indicted his client; in Sykes, counsel had
not objected to the government's use of the defendant's statement. To
raise each issue for the first time on habeas attack, the Francis Court
held that the defendant had to show "cause" why his counsel had not
complied with the procedural rule,"' and to show that counsel's fail-
,,' See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,438 (1963). Fay seemed to require that the defendant make
a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. at 439. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), limited
Fay by suggesting that the attorney could bind his client without consulting him, as long as
the decision to do so was tactically based. Id. at 451. See also Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969
Term-Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REV.
I, 16-18 (1970).
IN See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The Court discussed deliberate by-pass, but did not bar federal
habeas review on that ground because the attorney did not make a tactical decision to have his
client dressed in jail clothes. Petitioner's Appendix at 47, 58, 73, Estelle v. Williams, ibid.
Counsel did not object because he thought the local practice was for an incarcerated defendant
to wear jail clothes, and because he was unaware that the Fifth Circuit had found that practice
inherently unfair.
I" Id. at 512-513. Because an objection to the jail clothes involved a "trial-type" decision,
id. at 514 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring), the trial court was not required to ask the defendant
whether he wanted to object. Based on this analysis, the Court in the future could decide that
an attorney will be held to. have made a tactical decision whenever he might have made one,
whether or not he actually did so. Cf id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring) (no collateral attack
where the attorney makes an "inexcusable procedural default").
-' 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
110 97 S.Ct. 2497 (1977).
425 U.S. at 542. In Francis. the Court applied to state defendants the same proof require-
ments it had imposed on collateral attack of a federal conviction. See Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233 (1973) (interpreting Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
Without explaining how a state defendant established either "cause" or "actual prejudice," the
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ure had "actually prejudiced" him."'
It appears nearly impossible for a defendant to satisfy the require-
ments of Estelle, Francis and Sykes. If his counsel did not know he
could object, a defendant might avoid Estelle. But few attorneys are
likely to admit their ignorance since, in effect, they would be confess-
ing to incompetency. Even if the attorney were found incompetent for
having failed to object,"3 the defendant would still not gain review
where a state procedural rule existed because, under Francis and
Sykes, he also must show "actual prejudice."
Clever defendants might choose to base their appeal initially upon
ineffectiveness grounds rather than upon the issue not raised by coun-
sel."' Yet it seems inconceivable that the Supreme Court would per-
mit such an easy circumvention of its careful limits on federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction. Moreover, if the appellate court decides that the
undeclared motion would have been denied, or that any error in
admitting the unchallenged evidence was harmless, it is senseless to
find that the attorney's failure violated the sixth amendment."' To
reverse the conviction by finding a sixth amendment violation would
force the government to retry the defendant when the appellate court
had found that the failure to object, or an incorrect decision by the
lower court had counsel made the motion, would have made no con-
stitutional difference.
Francis Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's denial of relief but remanded the case to the district
court to allow the defendant to establish "actual prejudice." 425 U.S. at 542.
1 425 U.S. at 542. Sykes extended Francis in two ways. First, the Court suggested that the
defendant could not establish "cause" if his attorney had decided not to object for tactical
reasons. 97 S.Ct. at 2507 n.12 and 2508 n.14. The Court seemed to say that if the attorney
should have recognized that an objection was appropriate, he will be held to have made a
tactical decision not to object, whether or not the record indicates that that was the case.
Second, Sykes extended Francis' treatment of "actual prejudice." Without defining that
term, the Court reviewed the record and held that the defendant could not establish "actual
prejudice" on the facts presented. 97 S.Ct. at 2509. In effect, the Court was willing to analyze
whether any error was harmless without giving the defendant the opportunity, as it had in
Francis, to establish "actual prejudice."
" Neither Francis nor Sykes indicates whether the failure to object constitutes ineffective
representation, or whether that finding would constitute "cause."
" Or, a defendant, after a post-conviction court decides that his attorney's failure to object
bars review of the merits of the government's conduct, might resurrect his attack as a sixth
amendment challenge to his attorney's failure.
"' But see Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted,.
F.2d - (9th Cir. 1977) (defense attorney had not moved to suppress evidence, and on
collateral attack, district court would not let defendant assert that failure as a sixth amendment
claim). The Ninth Circuit held that the sixth amendment claim was independent of the fourth
amendment claim, and remanded for determination whether the attorney had been ineffective,
but did not explain how the district court was to decide whether failure to object amounted to
ineffective representation. The district court could find that failure to object did not prejudice
the defendant, or that the failure was a harmless error, essentially the same tests it had applied
earlier.
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Since the failure to object can have a severe consequence,"' the
importance of the guidelines ordering attorneys to protect the record
is obvious. Nevertheless, the practical problems of criminal practice
suggest that adoption of the guidelines may not improve defense
representation significantly, unless at a point before the verdict there
is some way to check whether the attorney did follow them.
B. Why Do Attorneys Act Ineffectively?
The practical realities of criminal practice pressure attorneys to
limit their preparation, to encourage plea bargaining, and to avoid
going to trial. The work load is frequently very heavy. Public defend-
ers usually cannot limit their caseloads and many private attorneys
maintain a heavy caseload because criminal practice is often not
lucrative. Because most private attorneys practice by themselves or
in a loose association with a few other attorneys, they often have
trouble covering every court appearance and try to avoid continu-
ances. They "research" the law by discussing questions with fellow
attorneys." 7 If they must go to trial, they do so without adequate
preparation or adequate support."' Attorneys are frequently unable
to hire an investigator to gather witnesses, prepare testimony, or
perform the legwork that is invariably necessary.
Many defense attorneys also misunderstand their role."' If attor-
neys think their clients are guilty, they often decide not to speak with
them or to investigate their cases. And it is easy for a defense attorney
to become insensitive. Because other clients with similar "stories"
pleaded guilty, the attorney doubts the truth of the new client's ex-
" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), demonstrates another reason why attorneys must
understand the importance of deciding whether to object. In Stone. the Court barred federal
collateral attack when state courts had provided the opportunity for a full and fair hearing of
a fdurth amendment claim, even if the state decision was wrong. O'Beery v. Wainwright, 546
F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977), interpreted Stone to mean that federal habeas was barred when the
state court had had the opportunity to pass on the merits of a fourth amendment claim, but
chose instead to deny the appeal on the adequate state ground doctrine. Stone may be expanded
to cover other than fourth amendment challenges. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 517-18
& n.13 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1251-54 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (claiming Stone should apply to fifth amendment issues).
"' This can lead to ineffectiveness claims if the other attorney's advice is erroneous. See
Heard v. United States, 419 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (trial attorney did not explore relation-
ship between client's drug addiction and defense of mental illness because of erroneous advice
that addiction was irrelevant when charge was possession of heroin for sale).
SCf. Bazelon, The Realities. supra note 9 at 815 (discussing problems of preparation
common to the criminal bar).
"I The attorney must be devoted solely to his client. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 725 (1948); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942). Misunderstandings occur
frequently at sentencing when some attorneys do not realize they must marshal any information




planation and decides not to waste valuable time on that case. 20
The fear of losing future court appointments may also influence a
private attorney not to represent a client aggressively before the judge
who appointed him.' 2' In marginal cases, the attorney might urge his
client to plea bargain. He might forego objections on motions he was
uncertain he could win. He might not ask the court to appoint investi-
gators or experts, especially if he feared that the judge might subtract
any money spent on those resources from the remuneration he re-
ceives.
Given these practical considerations, adoption of the ABA guide-
lines will improve defense representation only if attorneys rethink the
way in which they represent their clients, 22 or if courts determine in
advance of the verdict whether the attorney has followed the guide-
lines.
C. Problems with Adopting the Guidelines:
What Questions Are Not Answered?
There are several problems with defining the attorney's obligations
in terms of the ABA guidelines. The guidelines are incomplete; con-
sultation, investigation, and protecting the record do not fully de-
scribe the attorney's responsibilities. Moreover, the guidelines offer
little help in answering specific questions. Ordering an attorney to
speak with his client, to investigate, or to object does not tell him how
far he must go or when he may stop. The guidelines cannot strip the
attorney of the power to decide that further investigation would be
fruitless or that a motion is clearly meritless. On the other hand,
courts cannot give the attorney complete power to make those deci-
sions. It would be far too easy for him to concoct some justification
I" See United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976), Transcript of hearing at 38-9,
May 18, 1976 (on remand, trial counsel justified asking defendant to find witnesses rather than
searching for them himself, because defendant told him "the same old thing, saying that he
was just an innocent bystander").
121 Judges often decide who to appoint, what compensation to pay, or the number of billable
hours. See, Joint Committee of the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit
and the District of Columbia Bar (Unified), Report on Criminal Defense Services in the District
of Columbia (April, 1975) 58-60 (hereinafter A ustern-Reznick Report); Tague, An Indigent's
Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REv. 73, 81-2 nn. 50 & 52 (1974).
12 Unless they are adopted as counsel's duties, few attorneys are likely to follow the guide-
lines because they are inconsistent with the way many attorneys try cases. In Commonwealth
v. Saferian, 315 N.E. 2d 878 (Mass. 1974), the trial attorney testified that his usual approach
was to forego pre-trial preparation and proceed through impromptu cross-examination. Al-
though his technique of a "bludgeoning frontal attack" on the witness might be effective, it
could not prevent him from avoiding traps set by the prosecution. Id. at 881. See also United
States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 353-54 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding no strategic reason for
attorney's failure to object other than to avoid unnecessary delay and maintain "amicable
relations with the trial judge").
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for his failure to investigate or to object. Balancing these considera-
tions will not be easy for either the attorney or the post-conviction
court. After reading DeCoster H and reviewing the ABA guidelines,
what should the attorney decide to do in the following situations and
how does a post-conviction court decide whether he acted
"effectively?"
1. Consultation with the client. Ordering an attorney to speak
with his client can clash with the attorney's power to control presenta-
tion of the defense case. Because of his supposed experience and
intelligence, the attorney is expected to make all decisions concerning
the defense case. 23 The attorney may believe that he must keep
certain information from his client because he fears that the client
will disagree with the attorney's decision.'2  For example, does an
attorney act properly if he withholds information in the following
cases?
a. The attorney believes his client will not accept a favorable plea
bargain if the elements of the crime are explained to him.'1
b. The attorney thinks his client should not testify. To ensure that
he does not insist upon testifying, the attorney decides not to explain
a possible challenge to the government's use of the defendant's prior
convictions for impeachment.'12
c. The attorney receives information that might undercut the gov-
ernment's case, but fears that its presentation might backfire and hurt
the defense. The attorney cannot verify the accuracy of this informa-
tion to his satisfaction and decides against mentioning it to his client,
fearing that the defendant will nonetheless insist upon using it.2 7
d. The attorney believes his client will concede nothing, and de-
' See, e.g., United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v.
Gatdner, 71 Cal. 2d 843, 851, 457 P.2d 575, 580, 79 Cal. Rptr. 743, 748 (1969).
'2 ABA Defense Function standard 5.2 reinforces this dilemma by authorizing the attorney
to make any tactical decision, but only after consultation with his client. See also United States
v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
,2 Cf. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (defendant's guilty plea involuntary when
attorneys did not explain elements of charge to him, because they thought he would not
understand and would not plead if informed; question of ineffectiveness not raised).
'2 Cf. United States v. Brown, No. 76-162 (D.D.C. May 31, 1977) (unpublisheal memoran-
dum order) (defendant claimed he chose not to testify because he feared impeachment; convic-
tion not reversed because court accepted attorney's testimony that he had recommended that
client not testify for other reasons).
,'2 See United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (attorney learned
defendant's wife possibly involved with principal government witness, but could not verify this
information and decided not to inform client; no ineffective representation but counsel's deci-
sion not to discuss matter with client criticized). Cf. United States v. Edmonds, 535 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1976) (violent argument between defendant and attorney in front of jury about whether
to call and accuse a particular person as informant).
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cides not to tell him of a possible motion to suppress which the
attorney is sure will be denied.
The answers to the first two examples are clearest. The defendant,
rather than the attorney, must ultimately decide whether to plea
bargain,' 8  testify,'1 or waive a jury trial.'30 The attorney should
discuss all options with him. The last two situations seem to fall
within the attorney's sphere of power. Yet some attorneys have been
criticized for deciding not to share that kind of information with their
clients.' 3' After all, it is the defendant, and not the attorney, who
goes to jail after a guilty verdict. If the defendant is willing to risk
irritating the judge by insisting on a meritless motion, why should he
be unable to decide what motions will be made? On the other hand,
should the attorney try to protect the defendant against making bad
tactical judgments? 2 As long as the power arrangement between the
attorney and client remains unclear, ordering the attorney to consult
with his client may increase ineffectiveness appeals without clearly
improving the quality of representation.
2. Investigation. The relationship that an attorney has with his
client and with the court can be further strained if the attorney must
be ordered to investigate. What options does the attorney have in the
following situations?
a. The attorney believes that investigation is a waste of time. His
representation began long after the crime occurred and his client does
not know of any witnesses. Formal discovery reveals no leads. If the
attorney must investigate, where does he begin? Must he, as in
DeCoster, go to the hotel and bar?'3
I" See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
,2 ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 103 § 5.2(a)(iii). But see Poe v.
United States, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (counsel can stop defendant from testifying for
tactical reasons, but not because he incorrectly thought government could impeach the defen-
dant with prior statements). Often, attorneys urge clients not to testify because the government
could impeach them with prior convictions, but they do not move to suppress the government's
use of those convictions. Is this failure to object ineffective representation? See United States
ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976) (no);
United States v. Brown, No. 76-162 (D.D.C. May 31, 1977) (no).
'3* See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
' ' See United States v. Moore, 554 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
132 A problem arises when counsel and defendant disagree about the defense to present.
Must an attorney honor his client's desire not to present a certain defense, or must he present
that defense to protect his client? But if he raises the defense on his own, does he violate the
attorney-client privilege? See Taylor v. State of Alabama, 291 Ala. 760, 287 So. 2d 901.
(1973)(counsel thought defendant should argue self-defense, but defendant insisted upon an alibi
defense and counsel acceded to client's demand. After conviction, defendant moved for a new
trial on the ground that counsel should not have presented alibi defense; the court of appeals
agreed, but state Supreme Court reinstated the conviction).
'3 An attorney cannot decide not to interview a witness because he thinks the witness will
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b. The defendant tells his attorney that someone witnessed the
incident but he does not know the person's name or address. Must
the attorney search for this person, or can he tell his client that he
will interview the witness once his client finds him?'34 What must the
attorney do if his client fails or does not even attempt to locate that
witness?
c. Is the attorney, on the basis of his experience in other cases,
precluded from deciding not to investigate? The attorney may have
found that co-counsel rarely permit interviews of their clients, that
police officers uniformly refuse to discuss the case, and that victims
are not only reluctant to talk, but become more hostile if ap-
proached."
d. The attorney fears that investigation may uncover information
that will undercut his client's story. He is also uncertain whether he
must confront his client with this information and fears confrontation
will destroy his uneasy relationship with the client. Must he
investigate? If he investigates and confronts his client, but is not
satisfied that his client is telling the truth, does the attorney suborn
perjury if he permits his client to testify inconsistently with the infor-
mation from his investigation?
If the defendant contradicts an earlier statement made to his attor-
ney, must the attorney investigate to see which story is true? Is it
unethical for the attorney to investigate, because he appears to be
working against his client?' Should investigation prove one story
incorrect, is the attorney ethically obligated to confront his client?
not help, Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1970); because he thinks that the witness
would not remember the incident, Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972); or because he
thinks the witness has already truthfully discussed the incident with the police, DeCoster 11,
supra note 10, slip op. at 17 n.27.
'3' See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir.), (finding no
ineffectiveness when attorney searched unsuccessfully for witnesses but did not request investi-
gative help), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). But see McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp.
297 (E.D. Va. 1972) (fact that counsel of record not paid and that defendant was not helpful
does not excuse defense attorney's failure to investigate).
133 Cf. United States v. Moore, 529 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (attorney cannot decide not
to interview because he expects witness will refuse to talk); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d
207, 216 (8th Cir. 1974) (condemning attorney's policy not to interview government witnesses
because he feared accusation of bribery or unethical conduct).
I"' At the remand hearing in DeCoster 1, Judge Waddy thought investigation might be
unethical. The attorney would be investigating to find information to impeach his own client.
If the attorney found inconsistent information, he might be suborning perjury if he let the
defendant testify to the version proved wrong. Record, supra note 50, at 99, 110. Chief Judge
Bazelon, on the other hand, thought the attorney was ethically obligated to investigate and to
confront his client with that inconsistent information to prevent the defendant from perjuring
himself in the way that DeCoster had almost surely done. DeCoster II, supra note 10 at 19.
But Bazelon does not explain what the attorney should do if he is uncertain which version is
the truth. Can the attorney evaluate which version the jury is more likely to accept?
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Can the attorney permit his client to testify to the version which was
proven false?'37 What happens if the defendant, when confronted
with the investigation, acknowledges that his first story was a lie, but
insists that the second version is true? Is this enough for the attorney
to let him testify to the second version?
The problems presented by these and other questions are well
known,'38 but most attorneys prefer to avoid confronting them.
Ostrich-like, they choose not to investigate, or decide that the defen-
dant is stalling to get the best offer possible before pleading guilty,
or testing the attorney to see if he can be trusted. If the defendant
insists on a trial, these attorneys select between the inconsistent sto-
ries by asking the defendant questions that are designed to cement
the defendant to the more convincing version. Do the ABA guidelines
condemn this kind of pragmatic approach?
e. The attorney believes that his client is lying and that he both
should and will be found guilty. Must he still investigate, either to
support his client's position or to undercut the government's case? Is
his decision not to investigate justified if the government's witnesses
appear truthful and the government's case seems unassailable? Is it
justified if the defendant is ambivalent or switches stories? Or, does
the attorney abrogate the jury's role if he can decide whether his
client is lying?'
If the defendant has admitted guilt, but is willing to risk trial, is
the attorney obligated to prepare all defenses ethically available?40
7 See Thornton v. United States 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1976) (defendant switched his defense
from attempt to explain his presence at the scene to an alibi; counsel thought switch m stories
was a lie, and moved to withdraw because he believed client intended to perjure himself. Motion
was denied but counsel did not argue client's story in summation. On appeal, defendant claimed
attorney was ineffective because he did not believe change in story. Held: defense counsel
recognized ethical duty not to argue perjured testimony and had vigorously represented client
by attacking the government's evidence).
See generally, M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
' The issue underlying the questions posed in this section is whether the attorney's role is
to help the jury reach an accurate verdict or to help his client challenge the government's case
in the best way possible. Because Judge MacKinnon apparently believes the former, he argued
that the attorney has no obligation to investigate to support a fabricated defense. DeCoster I,
supra at 10, slip op. at II (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). While no one would dispute that
argument, MacKinnon begs the question of how an attorney decides that his client is lying. As
the questions in this section suggest, defense attorneys must live with more uncertainty than
MacKinnon seems to assume exists. Chief Judge Bazelon would appear to choose the latter
definition of the attorney's role. See Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra note 9 at 2. With a
disagreement so basic, it is understandable why judges clash in deciding when counsel's deci-
sions about investigation amounts to ineffective representation.
"I0 See Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1963) (attorney is obligated to
investigate). See also ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 103, § 4.1 (attor-
ney's obligation to investigate is independent of client's statements concerning guilt).
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Must the attorney search for witnesses to shake the government's
case, even if he cannot offer evidence to support his client's lie?
3. Raising objections. Given the Supreme Court's restrictions on
habeas corpus review, the careful attorney may object on all possible
bases. Would he be ineffective if he decided not to do so, because he
believed that some motions would fail, that they would not reveal new
information, or that constant objections would only irritate the
judge."' Should not the duty to preserve the record only require the
attorney to consider whether to object? If it demands any more, one
can imagine an attorney under-cutting this command by explaining
to the judge that the motion he just made is mandated by DeCoster,
thereby flagging his assessment of the motion's merits and inviting
the judge to deny it." 2
V. Is DeCoster H's DEFINITION OF THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN
CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT?
The defendant cannot meet his burden of establishing ineffective
representation simply by showing that his attorney violated one of the
ABA guidelines."3 In defining his burden, courts can choose between
two approaches. They could make it relatively easy for the defendant
to establish a constitutional violation, but refuse to reverse the con-
viction if the attorney's failures were harmless error. Or, they could
require the defendant to make a significant showing of prejudice
caused by his attorney's failures,"' and reverse automatically, with-
out considering harmless error, if the defendant met that burden.
DeCoster II chose the first approach. In Beasley v. United States,"5
' See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defense counsel can
decide not to make certain motions if he believes they will lose); Harried v. United States, 389
F.2d 281, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (defense attorney not required to "make every motion in the
book"). Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 238 (1967) (appellate counsel may decline to press
an appeal, but must note why he thinks possible issues are not meritorious).
14 See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 433 (D.C. 1976) (defense counsel told trial
court he believed defendant's pro se motion was meritless, but urged court to hear motion to
protect the record).
"' United States v. DeCoster, supra note 10, slip op. at 11. See State v. Harper, 57 Wis.
2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973) (adopting ABA standards as partial guidelines but finding effec-
tive representation when attorney first interviewed client shortly before trial, did not review
police reports or seek alibi witnesses, or move to suppress certain evidence; court did not say
whether the defendant was harmed in any way by attorney's conduct).
I" A finding that the attorney's representation was a "farce" usually assumed that the
defendant had been prejudiced. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748,
(3d Cir. 1968), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d
Cir. 1970). The "reasonable competency" test requires that the defendant prove he was preju-
diced by his attorney's representation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531
F.2d 169 (3d Cir.) (no ineffective representation when the defendant had not shown how
unlocated witness could have helped), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
14 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
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the Sixth Circuit chose the second approach in a decision where that
circuit also rejected the "farce" test.
In choosing between DeCoster I's and Beasley's approaches,
courts must resolve two issues concerning the purpose of post-
conviction review. First, should courts try to protect only the individ-
ual defendant against an unfair verdict, or should they try to prod all
attorneys to provide better representation? Second, is a trial fair if
the verdict appears reliable, or is it fair only if the defendant had a
full opportunity to present his own case and to dispute the govern-
ment's case?
In Beasley, the defense attorney neither interviewed nor subpoe-
naed several eyewitnesses who were unable to identify the defendant,
and another witness whom the defendant claimed would have pro-
vided him with an alibi.'" The attorney thought the government was
required to call the eyewitnesses. The only defense witness was an
F.B.I. agent who was called for the bizarre purpose of showing that
the agent was prejudiced against the defendant. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that counsel had deprived his client of a "substantial de-
fense" because he had not attacked the government's identification
evidence.' 7 Without defining a "substantial defense" the court re-
versed Beasley's conviction, holding that a finding of ineffective rep-
resentation required automatic reversal. "'
DeCoster II focuses on the attorney's conduct, while Beasley con-
centrates on the reliability of the verdict.' DeCoster II does not
require the defendant to show either that the information overlooked
was admissible at trial 50 or that the verdict might, or would, have
differed. Beasley probably requires proof of both.
Beasley leaves two important questions unresolved. First, the court
does not explain what it considers a "defense." In Beasley the term
is apparently not limited to affirmative defenses but includes attacks
"I Id. at 691. The government's bank robbery case was largely circumstantial. The defen-
dant's palm print appeared on the note given to the bank teller, the defendant had access to
the type of lettering device used to stencil the note, and one government witness testified that
the defendant resembled the robber. Id. at 690.
"I Id at 696.
I Id.
"' This difference between DeCoster II and Beasley is illustrated by Woody v. United States,
369 A.2d 592 (D.C. 1977), where the defense attorney failed to get defendant's bank account
record, failed to explain the defendant's possession of money, failed to file certain pretrial
motions, failed to object to certain misstatements in the prosecution's summation, failed to
request or object to jury instructions and neither adequately consulted with the defendant before
trial nor attempted to find a favorable eyewitness. Nonetheless, defense counsel's representation
was not ineffective, because the defendant failed to show how any failure had eliminated a
substantial defense. See also Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
I" But see McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 220 (8th Cir. 1974) (uninvestigated evidence
must be admissible at trial).
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on crucial elements of the government's case, such as identification.
But uninvestigated information that counsel could have used to corro-
borate other evidence, impeach a government witness, or convince his
client to plea bargain, probably would not constitute a "defense." In
contrast, proof of these potential uses of evidence should satisfy the
defendant's burden in DeCoster.
Second, Beasley fails to explain when a defense is "substantial."
Because the case requires automatic reversal after a finding of inef-
fective representation based on a failure to present a "substantial
defense," a defense might be interpreted as "substantial" only if it
would have created a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 5,
Courts that are ready to reject the "farce" test will probably prefer
the analysis in Beasley to that in DeCosterH.111 Beasley's definition
of the defendant's burden seems more consistent with recent Supreme
Court decisions, 113 is less likely to require reversal of the defendant's
conviction, and does not impose as much pressure on the trial court
to oversee defense counsel's representation.151
A. What Is the Constitutional Test of
Ineffective Representation?
The Supreme Court requires a defendant to establish that he was
"prejudiced" by the alleged basis of ineffectiveness.'5 DeCoster spe-
cifically rejects the term "prejudice" to define the defendant's bur-
den. 56 After the defendant shows a "substantial violation" of coun-
sel's duties, the burden shifts to the government to prove the absence
of "prejudice" caused by the attorney's failing.'57 Of course, too much
can be made of the differences between the terms of art chosen to
"' See 491 F.2d at 696. In the en banc reconsideration of DeCoster II, the government
argued that Beasley should be interpreted in this way, and that the en banc court should adopt
the Beasley approach.
"I In contrast to DeCoster II and Beasley, the Eighth Circuit has a third approach: the
circumstances of each case may require a different allocation of the burden. See Thomas v.
Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.) (no explanation of what factors justify a different alloca-
tion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
' See Part V(A), infra.
"u See note 176 and accompanying text, infra.
" See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (neither last-minute substitution of
counsel nor attorney's failure to exclude evidence that was excluded from prior trial prejudiced
defendant's case). Cf Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972) (apparent conflict in counsel's
representation of another person was insufficient to render guilty plea involuntary).
DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1204; DeCoster11, supra note 10, slip op. at 25.
I ld. Cf Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 704 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (defendant can meet
his burden by showing admissible evidence which "could have been presented at the trial and
which would have proved 'helpful' to the defendant," thereby shifting the burden to the govern-




The Supreme Court has never explained what it means by
"prejudice" in an ineffective representation case. The Court will
probably define that term as it defined "materiality" in Agurs v.
United States.' In Agurs, the defense attorney had not requested,160
and the government had not disclosed, the victim's record of prior
convictions in a murder case where the defense was self-defense. The
Court held that the defendant's burden was to prove that the non-
disclosed information was "material." "Materiality" was defined in
terms of the justice of the verdict.' The defendant could not establish
materiality simply by claiming that the undisclosed evidence might
have helped her to present her case more forcefully,'62 or that it might
have influenced the jury to reach a different verdict. 63 Agurs thus
differs markedly from DeCoster H, and joins a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions that apparently limit post-conviction relief
to defendants who are factually "innocent.""'
I" Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2511 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that the "language of the test the Court purports to apply" may not be important because cases
will instead turn on "the competence of counsel, the procedural context in which the asserted
waiver occurred, the character of the constitutional right at stake, and the overall fairness of
the entire proceedings").
150 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Judge MacKinnon apparently thinks that Agurs furnishes the correct
test. DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 40-41 (dissenting opinion). While a member of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens, who subsequently wrote the
Supreme Court's opinion in Agurs, defined the defendant's burden in an ineffective representa-
tion case in Agurs-like terms. See Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1976).
On the other hand, because Agurs was decided on fifth amendment due process grounds, it may
not furnish the correct definition of the defendant's burden in an ineffective representation case.
Most courts now agree that the right to effective representation is protected by the sixth
amendment. Consequently, they have held that the defendant's burden is lighter than that
imposed by due process process principles. See Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609,610 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). Cf Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336 (5th Cir. 1975) (where the defendant
is represented by appointed counsel, the issue should not be fairness of trial; due process
standard is embodied in the "farce" test).
118 Trial counsel believed the victim's prior record was inadmissible if unknown to the defen-
dant. When counsel learned that inadmissibility did not depend upon the defendant's knowl-
edge, he moved for a new trial based on the government's failure to disclose. 427 U.S. at 102
n .5.
1 427 U.S. at 112-13. For a detailed examination of the Agurs case, see Recent
Development, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 319 (1976).
"1 427 U.S. at 112 n.20.
"1 427 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 15 (this argument was rejected as the "sporting theory of justice;"
the jury should not be given another opportunity to "flout" the evidence).
Justice Stevens used the term "innocence" in writing the majority's Agurs opinion. Id. at
107, 110, 1!1. The first suggestion that post-conviction relief be conditioned on "innocence"
appeared in Justice Black's dissent in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969),
where the Court refused to limit habeas corpus relief to apparently innocent defendants. Id. at
228-30. In recent cases, Justice Black's suggested limitation appears to have gained support.
See Stone v. Powell, 423 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) ("the ultimate question of guilt or innocence
should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding," precluding collateral attack on the
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The Supreme Court has never explicitly distinguished between fac-
tual and legal "innocence," but Agurs could be interpreted as making
this distinction. If the distinction is appropriate, limiting relief to the
factually innocent differs from DeCoster's approach.6 5 This limita-
tion begs the crucial question of when a trial is "fair." At trial, the
burden of proof is the defendant's ally-it permits acquittal for jury
error or uncertainties in the government's case. Defense attorneys are
rarely able to convince the jury that the defendant is factually inno-
cent. In fact, many defense attorneys are reluctant to offer evidence
because they fear that the jury will decide by comparing the govern-
ment's evidence against the defendant's, rather than by testing the
government's evidence against its burden of proof. Agurs' apparent
focus on factual innocence rejects what DeCoster recognizes: a defen-
dant should be permitted to satisfy his post-conviction burden by
showing that he could have better prepared or presented his case-
in other words, that the failure to investigate affected the defense
strategy.
Two other differences between Agurs and DeCoster II are signifi-
cant. First, the Supreme Court refused to apply the harmless error
doctrine in deciding whether the defendant had been prejudiced by the
failure to disclose.' The Court did not distinguish between the exist-
ence of a constitutional violation and the influence of that violation
on the jury. Unlike DeCoster H, the defendant in Agurs had to prove
basis of fourth amendment claims fully litigated in state proceedings). Cf. Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 97 S. Ct. 2339, 2343 (1977) (the purpose of the burden of proof is "to prevent the
erroneous conviction of innocent persons"); Swain v. Pressley, 97 S. Ct. 1244 (1977) (at oral
argument Blackmun, J. asked counsel whether defendant claimed to be innocent) (conversation
with Mark Foster, defendant's counsel, Feb. 24, 1977); Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319,
2326 (1977) ("Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken ... to
eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person").
See also Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from
Habeas Corpus, 59 U. VA. L. REV. 927, 961-70 (1973) (arguing that courts should not reverse
on collateral review if attorney's conduct did not compromise reliability of the verdict, even if
it could have affected the jury's determination of guilt); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160-64 (1970) (ways
defendant might meet his burden often mean that he must show factual innocence). But see
Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus after Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only for the Arguably
Innocent?, I I U. RICH. L. REV. 291 (1977) (arguing that the Court has not yet limited habeas
corpus relief to innocent defendants).
IU In DeCoster I, Chief Judge Bazelon argued that the defendant is not required to prove
his innocence. DeCoster I, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1204.
The apparent requirement of Agurs that the defendant establish his innocence presents
appellate counsel with a dilemma. If his client admits he is guilty, how should counsel answer
the court's question whether the defendant is, in fact, innocent? Does the attorney-client privi-
lege bar counsel from answering? To avoid this dilemma, several appellate attorneys have told
the author that they do not ask their clients whether they are innocent.
I" United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-14 (1976).
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both to win reversal. 6 7
Second, in a footnote, the Agurs Court curtly said that the attor-
ney's failure to request discovery was not ineffective representation. 6 8
The Court understandably addressed the issue of ineffectiveness, even
though that issue had not been presented to it.' Without this foot-
note, the defendant might have tried to appeal again on the basis of
ineffective representation. The footnote suggests that the Supreme
Court would not agree with DeCoster II because the attorney's fail-
ure in Agurs clearly had the kind of impact on the defendant's case
that would meet the defendant's burden in DeCoster H.
B. Should the Standard Be Defined to Attempt to
Improve Representation?
In Estelle v. Williams,'70 the Court indicated that the trial court
must superintend its proceedings to ensure that the trial attorney
fulfills his responsibility,' but has no responsibility to oversee any
question that might involve a tactical decision by the defense attorney
or even to ascertain that the attorney's decision was a tactical judg-
ment.7 2 Although deciding to investigate, to consult with a defendant,
or to make some motion is not usually a matter of tactics, Estelle is
written so broadly that the Supreme Court is unlikely to require trial
courts to determine whether the defense attorney has investigated or
is prepared.'
The Supreme Court, however, has fashioned remedies to prevent
certain conduct by trial courts that interferes with the defendant's
right to counsel.' But in ineffectiveness cases, the culprit is the de-
117 Compare id. at 112-14, with DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 23-25.
"' Id. at 102 n. 5.
"' The district court had denied a motion for new trial on the ground of ineffectiveness. The
District of Columbia Circuit found the issue unnecessary to consider on appeal. 510 F.2d 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1975) The defendant decided not to present the issue to the Supreme Court as an
alternative ground upon which the Court could affirm.
170 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
"' See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (judges should "maintain
proper standard of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases
in their courts").
172 425 U.S. at 512. "Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of
counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and
during trial rests with the accused and his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the
duties of trial judges and counsel in our legal system." Id.
"' Estelle is consistent with recent decisions where the Court has refused to apply prophylac-
tic rules to outlaw governmental misconduct, even if its potential for prejudice is great. See
Manson v. Braithwaite, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977) (eyewitness identification); Weatherford v. Bur-
sey, 97 S. Ct. 837 (1977) (undercover agent overheard conversations between defendant and
counsel).
"I See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (automatic reversal when court
forbade defense attorney to speak with defendant during recess in defendant's testimony despite
1977]
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fense attorney rather than the court.' Chief Judge Bazelon intended
DeCoster 11's definition of the defendant's burden of proof to act as
a prophylactic to prevent ineffective representation.' Yet this kind
of remedy must be narrowly tailored so that it curtails illegitimate
behavior while not interfering with proper conduct. For example, an
explanation from a defense attorney about his preparation could vio-
late the attorney-client privilege, or the attorney might fear that any
information he gave to the judge would affect the judge's later deci-
sions in the case.17 Even if the standard were sufficiently precise, the
problem remains that many courts are unhappy with the prospect of
overseeing defense counsel. 7 1
C. Applying DeCoster II
The DeCoster II analysis can pressure trial courts and the govern-
ment to oversee defense attorneys, but no court should fear that the
standard will require wholesale reversals. Trial courts that have ap-
plied the DeCoster standard have reached inconsistent results. 79
defendant's failure to show prejudice); Herring v. New York 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (automatic
reversal when trial court refused to hear defense attorney's final argument). See also Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730, 734-35 (3d Cir. 1970) (harm presumed from late appointment of
counsel to force state courts to appoint counsel early in the proceedings).
"I Courts might also decide that DeCoster's standard is incorrectly designed because it
pressures the trial court rather than the real wrongdoer, the defense attorney. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370, 378 (1976) (vacating a district court injunction prophylactically
designed to force city officials to prepare a program to improve handling of citizens' complaints
against police when no showing that those officials authorized or encouraged the conduct
complained of).
"I This is clear from the Judge's writings, if not from his opinions in DeCoster I and I1.
See The Realities, supra note 9 at 823-24 (DeCoster I enunciated "prophylactic rules of
conduct for defense counsel").
"I Notwithstanding these problems, this article suggests in Part VII that the trial court must
interfere with the attorney-client relationship to improve defense representation.
"I See Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1974) ("counterproductive" to
require trial court to oversee retained counsel); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 792-
93 (D.C. Cir.) (requiring judges to intercede would "destroy concept of impartial judges," inter-
fere with attorney-client confidences, and discourage attorneys from accepting appointments
in criminal cases), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958). But cf ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE,
Section 1.1(a) (1972) (trial judge should initiate any matter "which may significantly promote
a just determination of the trial").
If the defendant complains to the judge about his attorney's representation, the judge should
intervene. By objecting, the defendant should waive the protection of the attorney-client privi-
lege. In DeCoster. for example, the judge failed to explore the basis for defendant's complaints
about his attorney. DeCoster 1I, supra note 10 slip op. at 5.
"I Following DeCoster I, several trial courts in the District of Columbia granted motions
for new trials on the ground of ineffective representation. See United States v. Lucas, 513 F.2d
509, 512 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (trial counsel failed to interview eyewitness). See Bazelon, The
Realities. supra note 9, at 829 n.82 (citing cases). But see United States v. Brown, No. 76-162
(D.D.C. May 31, 1977) (unpublished memorandum order)(no ineffective representation even
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DeCoster II leaves two unanswered questions whose ultimate resolu-
tion could permit any court to deny an ineffectiveness challenge.
First, DeCoster II does not explain how the government establishes
harmless error.8 0 Because the failure to investigate presents the ques-
tion of harmless error in an unusual way,' the definition given this
doctrine can greatly affect the government's chance to prevent rever-
sal. In Chapman v. California,182 the Supreme Court held that consti-
tutional errors were harmless only if they were found harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. In applying that formulation of harmless
error, the Court focused on the possible impact of a constitutional
violation on the jury, regardless of the weight of other evidence sup-
porting the verdict.8 3 In Harrington v. California,"' the Court
switched its emphasis, and said that a constitutional violation was
harmless error when "overwhelming evidence" supported the verdict
even after the offending evidence was subtracted.8 5 Although the
Court has never clearly applied either test of harmless error where
the alleged constitutional violation was ineffective representation, it
would probably apply the Harrington version.188
If Harrington provides the correct approach, the government can
prove harmless error relatively easily.8 7 If the omitted evidence
though counsel had not challenged whether government could use defendant's prior convictions
to impeach him (a failure that defendant claimed led him to decide not to testify at trial);
counsel had also based defense on misidentification despite defendant's admission to counsel
that he was inside bank and despite defendant's desire to argue that he was inside bank
innocently).
'1, While DeCoster II holds that the government must establish harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt, it fails to explain whether the government must show that the change in the
defense tactics, given the omitted information, would not have affected the jury's verdict, or
whether the government can show that overwhelming evidence existed to justify the verdict even
with the omitted information added.
I Rather than subtracting the offending evidence from the record, as is normally done in
assessing harmless error, the court must add the omitted evidence to that evidence presented
to the jury.
182 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
In id. at 24-26.
395 U.S. 250 (1969).
1 Id. at 254. Although the Court claimed to reaffirm Chapman's approach, id.. its decision
seems inconsistent with Chapman. See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
'" See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970) (apparently applying Harrington test
in holding that late appointment of counsel was harmless error). Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 97
S. Ct. 2497, 2509 (1977) (by reviewing entire record to determine whether evidence, besides
defendant's statement that his attorney had not moved to suppress, justified jury verdict, the
Court followed the Harrington approach without citing that case). But cf. Henderson v. Mor-
gan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (where the defendant attacked the voluntariness of his guilty plea
and argued that his attorneys had not adequately explained the elements of the crime to which
he pleaded, the Court cited neither Chapman nor Harrington, but indicated that the govern-
ment had not established harmless error, however it was defined).
" DeCoster illustrates the difference in result that cotild follow from applying Chapman
rather than Harrington. Unless DeCoster had been arrested on the scene, the evidence against
19771
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merely corroborates other defense evidence or bolsters an existing
attack on the government's case, then a court could find harmless
error.' " And even if the omitted evidence presents a new defense, such
as an alibi, 8' or a different type of attack on the government's case,9 0
the error might be harmless.
The second question left unanswered by DeCoster II is how the
reviewing judge, in deciding the harmlessness issue, can evaluate the
accuracy and impact of the omitted information. Should the judge
decide on the basis of his own reaction to the omitted evidence or
must he consider how the jury might have assessed that
information?"' There would be more reversals with the latter analysis
because the judge could only speculate about the jury's reaction and
could not consider any information that had not been presented be-
fore the jury."' But, in United States v. Agurs, the Supreme Court
suggested that the judge can evaluate his own reaction to the omitted
evidence." 3 This approach may reduce DeCoster I's pressure on
trial judges to oversee defense representation by reducing the pros-
pect of reversals.
The prophylactic force of DeCoster Il also decreases if the judge
can consider evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing that
was not presented to the jury. DeCoster's letter, with its inconsistent
statements, was first revealed at his post-conviction hearing. The
letter strengthened the government's case considerably. The govern-
ment might also have introduced evidence that it had discovered after
him could not have been more overwhelming. On the Harrington test, his conviction would have
been affirmed; on the Chapman test, his conviction was reversed, because no one knew what
evidence further investigation might have developed.
'm See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 114 (1976) (because victim's prior convic-
tions were cumulative of other evidence indicating that he was the aggressor and that the
defendant had acted in self-defense, the Court found no constitutional violation from the
government's failure to disclose).
,' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 177-78 (3d Cir.) (no
showing of prejudice from attorney's unsuccessful efforts to locate alibi witnesses, cert. denied,
425 U.S. 997 (1976).
'" But see Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 415-17 (8th Cir.) (omission not harmless when
testimony could have provided defense attorney with information for impeaching and attacking
government witness), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
"I See Thomas v. State, 512 S.W.2d 116, 125-26 (Mo. 1974) (Seiler, J., dissenting) (in post-
conviction evidentiary hearing, petitioner must show admissible evidence that would have
helped his trial presentation; court should not usurp jury role and weigh probative force of the
evidence), petition denied, Thomas v. Wyrick, 417 F.Supp. 508 (E.D. Mo. 1975), rev'd. 535
F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
t1Z For example, the judge could not consider evidence suppressed at a pre-trial motion, or
information provided by the attorneys during argument out of the presence of the jury or during
casual conversations.
11 427 U.S. 97, 113 (1976). In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the judge would usurp
the jury's function if he used this analysis. Id. at 117 nn. 5 & 6.
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the trial, or evidence that it had decided not to use at trial. If the judge
assesses just the impact of the omitted evidence on the jury, he should
not measure it against anything but the evidence actually presented
to the jury. But if the judge follows Beasley or Agurs, and decides
whether the verdict is reliable, he probably can consider any evidence
that is relevant to that inquiry.
D. Applying DeCoster II's Presumption
It is important to separate DeCoster H's use of the presumption
to satisfy the defendant's burden to show impact based on counsel's
failure from the case's definition of the defendant's burden of proof.
Courts could adopt DeCoster H's definition of the defendant's bur-
den but still reject its use of a presumption. Like Beasley, DeCoster
I requires the defendant to identify and produce the information his
attorney failed to find.' DeCoster did not do this, yet he still met
his burden because the court presumed that his attorney's "total
failure" to investigate impaired the defense.
Courts use presumptions in two situations: first, as a prophylactic
measure, where the defendant cannot establish the harm that was
probably caused by some unconstitutional conduct by the govern-
ment or the trial court; and, second, where a party cannot produce
evidence that is likely to exist and that is probably under the control
of the opponent. The facts of DeCoster II present neither situation.
1. The presumption as a prophylactic measure. DeCoster H's
presumption of impact arises under different circumstances than
many other presumptions, because the defense attorney, rather than
the government or trial court, 95 has committed the constitutional
violation. These presumptions are designed to force the government
or trial court to police itself, but the DeCoster presumption will
probably not prod defense attorneys to investigate. In fact, the pre-
sumption could invite abuse. The attorney might choose not to inves-
tigate, and if the defendant loses at trial, the attorney could claim that
his failure to investigate presumptively established prejudice. 6 Al-
though defense attorneys are not likely to do this,19 courts that sus-
"I' DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 20; Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696
(6th Cir. 1974).
" See note 174, supra. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (systematic exclusion of
blacks from grand and petit juries held prejudicial although defendant could not show actual
harm).
IN Cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2509 (1977) (to permit the defendant to raise
an issue for the first time on collateral attack could encourage his attorney not to make the
constitutional claim at trial on the hope that, if his client was convicted, he could bring it on
collateral attack).
I" The attorney faces severe disciplinary action if he fabricates a claim. See, e.g., McQueen
v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 n.15 (8th Cir. 1974) (deliberate error may prevent reversal and
19771
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pect that attorneys and defendants collaborate in claims of ineffective
representation may not accept DeCoster Hl's use of the presumption.
DeCoster II must assume that either the government or trial court
can police defense representation. But any such governmental over-
sight would interfere with the attorney-client relationship and the
function of the adversarial process.'98 And, as discussed earlier, 9 ' the
trial court is probably not obligated to oversee the defense. As a
result, the assumption upon which DeCoster II's use of the presump-
tion is based is probably wrong.
2. Does the evidence of impact probably exist and does the defen-
dant have access to it? Judge MacKinnon's criticism of the presump-
tion on the ground that the defendant should know more than the
government about the evidence his attorney failed to investigate is
wrong on the facts of DeCoster. °° If the defendant only knows the
sources his attorney did not investigate without knowing what might
have been discovered, as in DeCoster, he is not necessarily in a better
position than the government to locate that information. 0' Of course,
the defendant's appellate counsel should investigate to determine
whether he can find any overlooked information. If he finds any new
facts or witnesses he must produce them at the post-conviction hear-
ing and the presumption of impact would not be used. But if appellate
counsel cannot find any information, he has established one of the
bases to trigger the presumption.
Courts use presumptions only when the "presumed fact" probably
exists. 202 The "presumed fact" in DeCoster II is the impact caused
by the attorney's failure to investigate. The presumption is inextrica-
invites disciplinary action) (dictum). Cf McAleney v. United States, 539 F.2d 282 (1st Cir.
1976) (urging investigation of whether trial attorney intentionally misstated to his client the
government's representations concerning plea bargaining and sentence; disbarment a
possibility).
"I The government might, however, spur the defense attorney to investigate by asking him
to disclose his alibi witnesses under Rule 12.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
I See Part IV(B), supra.
See DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 34 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Judge MacKin-
non's criticism is factually, rather than legally, wrong. A state can, for example, constitutionally
place the burden of proving an affirmative defense upon the defendant when he has better access
to information relevant to that defense. See Patterson v. New York, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2323-24
n.9, 2326-27 n. 11 (1977).
"I If the attorney does not tell his client what sources he investigated, the defendant has no
means of attaining this information. See also Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the
Harmless Error Rule: The Eighth Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1384,
1404-05 & n. 129 (1975). An attorney's inadequacy may severely restrict the defendant's ability
to explain what information might have existed that timely investigation would have uncovered.
See United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Man-
drier v. Hewitt, 409 F. Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
202 See generally McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 346 (2d ed. 1972).
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bly linked with DeCoster ll's definition of the defendant's burden.
Investigation might help the defendant make a better decision about
trial tactics or plea bargaining. But the failure to investigate will not
frequently deprive the defendant of evidence that would have estab-
lished a "substantial defense" or his factual innocence. Therefore, if
the DeCoster II definition of the defendant's burden is wrong, the use
of the presumption is also wrong. 03 Certainly any court that adopted
the Beasley definition of the defendant's burden would not need to
use the presumption.
3. Can the defendant trigger the presumption? Even if it is not
wrong to presume harm in an ineffective representation case, few
defendants will be able to establish the "basic facts" 04 necessary to
trigger the presumption. According to DeCoster II, the defendant
must show that his attorney totally failed to conduct a factual investi-
gation and that his appellate counsel could not locate the missing
information.2 5 The defendant can establish the second "basic fact"
easily. But it is not clear what a "total failure" to investigate means.
If courts require defendants to show that their trial attorneys con-
ducted absolutely no investigation, few defendants will meet this bur-
den.
DeCoster II illustrates this problem of definition. The court's con-
clusion that trial counsel had totally failed to investigate seems both
unfair and wrong. The court unfairly restricted its analysis of what
the attorney had done to the evidence developed at the post-
conviction hearing. According to his testimony at the hearing, the
" Chief Judge Bazelon argued that the failure to investigate was inherently prejudicial.
DeCoster II, supra note 10, slip op. at 21. But only the violation of those rights that are basic
to a fair trial are inherently prejudicial. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1966).
Although the Supreme Court has found harm inherent in a denial of the right to counsel,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962), it has refused to place denial of effective counsel
in this category. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23.
DeCoster 1l's use of the motion for new trial as a procedural device to raise the issue of
ineffective representation (see notes 210-216 and text, infra) is of value in deciding whether
prejudice can be presumed. In its recent decisions restricting the availability of federal habeas
review, the Supreme Court has noted that the defendant is not entitled to any presumption of
prejudice once his conviction becomes final. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 n.6
(1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1973). Because any presumption of
prejudice disappears on collateral review, the defendant must establish "actual prejudice"
caused by the government's conduct that he challenges. But because the defendant moves for a
new trial on the ground of ineffective representation before his conviction becomes final, the
defendant should be entitled to any presumption of harm if he can establish the "basic facts"
that would trigger the presumption. DeCoster 1I's motion for a new trial circumvents the higher
burden of proof that Francis and Davis impose upon the habeas petitioner, and that procedural
device would thus permit DeCoster II's use of the presumption.
4 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 342-343 (2d ed. 1972).
DeCoster II, supra note 1O, slip op. at 21.
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trial attorney did not investigate at the bar or hotel, and spoke to the
witness Eley only moments before he testified. The remainder of the
record indicated, however, that at the preliminary hearing for all
three defendants, DeCoster's trial attorney had also represented the
third accomplice and had cross-examined the police officer who had
arrested DeCoster. Thus, the attorney knew what the police officer
and the two alleged accomplices would say, if called at the trial, and
had, in a sense, "investigated." Given the attorney's preparation,
even if perhaps inadequate, many courts would find that he had not
"totally failed to investigate."
VI. RAISING THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
A. Direct Appeal
Although a defendant can challenge the effectiveness of his attor-
ney's representation on direct appeal, this is not likely to happen.
First, since the trial attorney usually represents the defendant on
appeal, he is unlikely to question his own conduct, either because he
sees no error in his actions or wishes to conceal any error. Second,
the defendant may be unaware of any problem; attorneys are unlikely
to share their oversights and mistakes with their clients. Third, even
if the defendant does recognize the issue, he may be unable to raise
it on direct review. If the issue is not apparent from the record,2"1 the
appellate court may not accept additional evidence.2 °7 The defendant
might preserve the issue for direct appeal by objecting during the trial
to his attorney's representation. This is not likely to occur, because
the defendant may be unaware of his attorney's failures or might fear
the displeasure of either the judge or his own attorney. 208
2 Failure to investigate will rarely be apparent from the record, unless the defendant ob-
jected at trial. See United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States
v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf. United States ex el. Mandrier v. Hewitt,
409 F. Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (record may lack evidence of trial attorney's inadequacy
precisely because attorney was inadequate).
" See, e.g., United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1405-06 and n.8 (5th Cir. 1976)
(amplification of record only on collateral attack); United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 931,
932 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affidavits not considered on direct review); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d
30, 32 n.3 (9th Cir. 1962) (examination limited to trial record on direct appeal).
But see United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 961 (1976).
An interesting question is whether courts will interpret Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976), to require the defendant who is aware of his attorney's failure to investigate to object
to this failure. In Estelle, compelling the defendant to wear jail clothes at trial was not a
constitutional violation because the defendant did not make his objection known to the trial
judge. But Estelle should not be interpreted to require an objection because neither the trial
court nor the defendant can order the attorney to act where the controversy involves a question
of tactics. See Taylor v.. Alabama, 291 Ala. 760, 287 So. 2d 901 (1973).
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The defendant who recognizes an ineffectiveness issue might imme-
diately institute a collateral attack. Most courts, however, postpone
collateral review until they resolve all issues in the direct appeal. 20"
This delay, although understandable from the appellate court's view-
point, can be unfair to the defendant. Not only may his principal
attack be the ineffectiveness claim, but he may choose not to litigate
the issue if he is released from jail before the resolution of any direct
appeal. Even if this collateral attack is successful, the defendant can
never be compensated for the time he spent in jail pending a decision
on his direct appeal.
To permit the defendant to augment the record and to litigate his
claim immediately and to avoid the higher burden on collateral at-
tack, the DeCoster court created a new avenue to raise the issue of
ineffective representation. The defendant can move in the trial court,
before any direct appeal, or during its pendency, for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.210 If the trial court sees merit in the
motion, it should hold an evidentiary hearing2 ' and the appellate
court will stay consideration of the direct appeal until the trial court
reaches a decision. 12 If the trial court denies the motion, the court
of appeals will have a complete record to review the claim. This
procedure reinterprets Rule 33.2 To apply DeCoster requires defin-
209 See Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d 630, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (unless "special
circumstances" exist, collateral attack stayed pending resolution of direct appeal). Ineffective-
ness of counsel might constitute "special circumstances." Cf. In re Westmoreland, 58 Cal. App.
3d 32, 129 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1976) (collateral attack permitted where the prosecutor failed to
disclose material evidence at trial).
210 See DeCoster 1, supra note 10, 487 F.2d at 1204-05. Rule 33 provides in part that "A
motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before
or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending, the court may grant the
motion only on remand of the case." See also United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689, 692 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 935 n.I I (D.C. Cir. 1973); United
States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bazelon, Defective Assistance, supra
note 9 at 39.
21 To get the hearing, the defendant submits an affidavit detailing the attorney's errors. See
generally United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
212 See United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 935 n.II (D.C. Cir. 1973). Trial judges may
grant hearings infrequently because they know the evidence presented and probably have a
belief about what else the defense attorney could have done. The judge may deny the motion
summarily if the defendant never mentioned at trial the existence of witnesses he now claims
his attorney did not investigate. See United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Remand Hearing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6, May 3, 1974).
"I The general prerequisites for granting a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence are: I) the evidence was discovered since trial; 2) the party seeking a new trial must
show diligent efforts in seeking the new evidence; 3) the new evidence must not be cumulative
or impeaching; 4) it must be material to the issues involved; and 5) it must indicate that a new
trial would probably bring an acquittal. See, e.g., United States v.:Johnson, 327 U.S. 106
(1946); Woody v. United States, 369 A.2d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally 2 C.
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ing "newly discovered evidence" as evidence that did not appear in
the record on direct appeal instead of evidence of which the defendant
was not aware, because defendants often know the witnesses or
sources their attorneys failed to investigate.2 14
Even if DeCoster's reinterpretation stretches the rule's meaning,
that reinterpretation should protect the interests of both the govern-
ment and the defendant. It would restrict the application of the
DeCoster standard to two years from the date of the judgment,"l5 thus
limiting the time within which the defendant can suddenly
"remember" some evidence which his attorney allegedly had failed
to investigate. Two years is not too long for the government to guard
against losing its witnesses should the conviction be reversed and a
retrial become necessary. In most instances, the defendant will move
for a new trial simultaneously with, or soon after, the direct appeal
is filed. 216 If the defendant institutes his attack more than two years
after the judgment, he must appeal collaterally. Unfortunately, the
court in DeCoster did not adequately explain why it adopted this
sensible method to raise the issue of ineffectiveness, and no other
court has adopted it.
B. Collateral Attack
The defendant can still collaterally attack his attorney's represen-
tation even if he cannot appeal directly or through an expansion of
Rule 33. Collateral attack permits him to augment the record by
affidavit or by testimony at a post-conviction hearing. 20 But there are
hurdles in this path to relief.218 If DeCoster II is followed, the defen-
WRIGHT & F. ELLIOT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 557 (1969). The above
requirements indicate that the substantive test in Rule 33 places a burden on the defendant that
is much higher than the burden in DeCoster.
21 See, e.g.. United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trial court held that
witness not called at trial was not "newly discovered" because defendant and counsel knew
about him before the verdict); United States v. Smallwood, 473 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the
newly discovered evidence was the ground for claim of ineffective representation - the attor-
ney's failure to challenge seizure of items).
2 5 Rule 33 requires that the defendant move for a new trial on the ground of "newly
discovered evidence" within two years of the judgment. See United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d
689 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
ZI' Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires notice of appeal in a
criminal case "within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from."
27 See United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1405 (5th Cir. 1976) (referring to proceed-
ings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1548 (1977); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310
F.2d 30, 36 (9th Cir. 1962).
ZI' See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (barring federal collateral review of fourth
amendment claims when state court had provided opportunity for full and fair hearing). Yet
Stone should not be applied to sixth amendment ineffectiveness claims because ineffective
representation goes directly to the accuracy of the guilt determination process, which Stone said
federal habeas corpus was designed to protect. See id. at 493-94.
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dant's burden to show ineffectiveness or prejudice on collateral attack
is greater than on direct appeal."1 9 He may also have difficulty in
presenting his claim. He does not automatically receive a free tran-
script of his trial,2 0 appointment of an attorney,22' or discovery to
search for the evidence he claims was omitted and which he must
present at the hearing."' Nor does he automatically get the eviden-
tiary hearing he needs to explore his attorney's conduct.223 A court
can refuse a hearing if his allegations, even assuming their truth, do
not present a colorable claim. 24 Although some courts believe that
the defendant is entitled to at least one hearing to air any claim of
ineffective representation," 5 that has not proven true when the defen-
dant claims his attorney failed to investigate. A sweeping challenge
that the attorney completely failed to investigate is insufficient when
it does not allege the identity or expected testimony of the witnesses
omitted."' And it may not be enough to indicate the expected testi-
The federal district court need not hold a second evidentiary hearing if the state court
conducted a full and fair hearing to review the factual bases for the claim of ineffective
representation. See Franklin v. Wyrick, 529 F.2d 79, 81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 962
(1976). It is important that the standard be clear so that the state court's hearing is full and
fair. See United States v. Rispo, 470 F.2d 1099, 1103 (3d Cir. 1973). A second hearing may be
necessary if the state court failed to appoint an attorney for an indigent. See generally United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
"I See note 93 and accompanying text, supra.
220 See United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317, 324-26 (1976).
221 Because a habeas corpus attack is considered civil in nature, an indigent defendant does
not have a sixth amendment right to appointed counsel, unless an evidentiary hearing is re-
quired. See generally Hunter, Post-Conviction Remedies, 50 F.R.D. 153, 175 (1970); RULES
GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 8(c) (West
Federal Rules of Civil-Appellate-Criminal Procedure 1977) (hereinafter SECTION 2254
RULES).
2 In a federal collateral attack on a state conviction, the defendant is only "entitled to
invoke the processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, and
to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants
leave to do so, but not otherwise." SECTION 2254 RULES, supra note 221 at 6(a). See Wilson
v. Weigel, 387 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1967) (right to discovery in habeas corpus proceeding is no
greater than pre-trial right to discovery in criminal case).
223 Federal judges have discretion to grant a hearing after reviewing the defendant's petition,
the government's answer, and the record of the trial. SECTION 2254 RULES, supra note 221, at
8(a). See also Founts v. Pogue, 532 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 925 (1976);
United States ex rel. Mandrier v. Hewett, 409 F. Supp. 38, 44-46 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
2" See United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1406-07 (5th Cir. 1976) (no hearing when
defendant failed to suggest "concrete facts"); United States ex rel. Curtis v. Illinois, 521 F.2d
717, 719 (7th Cir. 1975). Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 794 (D.C. Cir.) (no
hearing if allegations pertain only to matters normally within counsel's judgment), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958).
2" See, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 417 F.Supp. 697, 713 n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
26 See Harshaw v. United States, 542 F.2d 455, 457 (8th Cir. 1976) (no hearing when record
failed to indicate what evidence could have been discovered through investigation); Matthews
v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975) (no hearing required when defendant did
not indicate what evidence investigation might have uncovered); Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089,
1093 (4th Cir. 1970) (not enough to name a witness without explaining expected testimony).
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mony of an overlooked witness, if the court, as a condition to grant-
ing the hearing, can evaluate whether that evidence would have
helped the defendant.2 2 Thus, even if DeCoster II's standards are
generally accepted, some courts could deny the defendant the oppor-
tunity to develop a record of his attorney's conduct because he could
not show the necessary foundation.
C. Post-Conviction Hearing: Problems in
Proving Ineffective Representation
The defendant's problems do not end once he gets a hearing. He
still faces formidable difficulties in gathering the evidence, deciding
how to present it, and convincing the court to review his trial attor-
ney's performance fairly. Usually, appellate counsel is reluctant to
attack a colleague, the trial attorney is antagonistic towards his for-
mer client, and the judge is displeased with the challenge. These
considerations suggest that some approach other than post-
conviction review is necessary to assure effective representation. The
hearing exacts too great a toll on those involved and too few deserving
defendants receive relief.
1. How does the defendant meet his burden? The defendant can-
not easily satisfy his burden of showing what his attorney failed to
do and how that failure affected or prejudiced his defense. His initial
decision of whether to testify at the hearing involves tactical consider-
ations similar to his decision to testify at the trial itself. He may be
forced to testify in a number of situations:22s if he must assert his
innocence as part of his burden; if he believes that only candor and
openness will sway a hesitant judge and he is willing to risk testifying
2m Jones v. Taylor, 547 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1977) (hearing unnecessary if expected testimony
of overlooked alibi witness would not have provided the defense asserted by the defendant);
See also United States v. Sellers, 520 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1975) (judge refused to subpoena
three out-of-state prisoners because he discredited their affidavits), modified on other grounds,
574 F.2d 785 (1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 815 (1977); Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220, 1222-
23 (Ist Cir. 1974) (no hearing when magistrate discredited partial alibi provided in defendant's
ex-wife's affidavit).
11 A problem that apparently has not arisen is whether the government could call the
defendant as its own witness, because the habeas proceeding is considered civil in nature. Cf.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969) (habeas corpus proceedings generally character-
ized as civil but actually "unique"). The government might want to call the defendant in two
instances: first, to ask him if he is innocent, if he did not testify at the trial; second, to establish
bases for impeachment if it intended to call the trial attorney to ask whether the defendant had
admitted anything inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing. Even if the government can
call the defendant, he should still be able to invoke the fifth amendment in regard to particular
questions. Of course, the government could call the defendant to cross-examine him if the court
accepted the defendant's affidavit in place of direct examination. See United States v. Hurt,
543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976), record of hearing at 70 (May I, 1974).
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about his involvement in the crime charged;12 1 if he is the only person
who can establish the factual basis of his claim; 211 or if he is uncertain
whether to call his trial attorney when the attorney's position is un-
clear and the jurisdiction's evidentiary rules prevent him from leading
or impeaching any witness he calls.23'
The defendant may choose not to testify, even if that decision
makes it difficult for him to establish his burden. The defendant may
fear that the trial judge will assess his credibility unfavorably and
deny his motion, despite its merits. He may fear a perjury charge, 2
especially if he must testify about his participation in the crime. The
risk of perjury exists even if prosecutors do not usually bring the
charge, if only because they cynically expect him to perjure himself,
or because they do not believe that the mere threat of a perjury charge
will deter an already convicted defendant from lying.2 33 The defen-
dant could reduce the risk of perjury by restricting the scope of his
testimony or by invoking the fifth amendment. 214
A defendant may also be reluctant to testify if the government can
use his testimony at a retrial. In many jurisdictions, the government
could use his testimony for subsequent impeachment purposes.2 31
' Most judges probably believe that a defendant's failure to give "forthright and credible
testimony [at a hearing on a post-conviction motion] . . . virtually dooms his cause." See Bruce
v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (defendant did not testify at post-
conviction hearing; no ineffective representation).
" This most commonly occurs when the defendant claims that he gave his attorney the
name of a witness or that his attorney erroneously advised him concerning the plea negotiations
or his decision to testify.
I" Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence rejects this "voucher" rule and permits the
proponent to lead or impeach his own witnesses.
2 See People v. Morris, 20 Cal. App.3d 659, 97 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1971) (consecutive sent-
ences imposed in perjury conviction to deter defendant and others from making perjurious
claims of ineffective representation). Cf Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1125 (1975) (suggesting that defendant be prosecuted for perjury based
on his charge against his attorney).
2 Compare Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1962) (threat of perjury
ineffective deterrent to prisoners) and Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(convicts not subject to prosecution for perjury), cert. denied, 325 U.S 889 (1945), with Jones
v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (defendant can be punished for perjury by courts or
by parole board).
21' By testifying only about the factual basis of the charge, the defendant might block the
government from asking about his participation in the crime, as long as the jurisdiction limited
cross-examination to the scope of the direct examination. This would not work, however, if the
defendant must testify that he was innocent, or must testify about how his attorney's failure
affected the defense case. And, some courts might circumvent an evidentiary restriction on
cross-examination by holding that the defendant's culpability is relevant in assessing his credi-
bility.
The defendant could invoke the fifth amendment to refuse to answer any question that he
considered was beyond the scope of his direct examination. Of course, by refusing to answer,
the defendant would undercut his credibility and probably damn his motion.
m Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (pre-trial statements inadmissible
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Usually the defendant will run this risk, since he has already been
convicted. His decision to testify is more difficult, however, if his
testimony is not crucial and the area about which he would testify
would be revealed for the first time at the post-conviction hearing.
For example, could the government, at retrial, use the letter DeCoster
sent his attorney? Since the letter was revealed through the trial
attorney's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the government
might not be able to use it at retrial unless the defendant had also
testified about it. By analogy to fourth amendment cases, the govern-
ment would have the difficult burden of showing that it would have
discovered the letter independently of the sixth amendment viola-
tion.2 3
Even if the defendant decides to testify, he may not be able to show
the effect of his attorney's failure.237 If he cannot decide questions
of trial tactics,2 38 for example, his opinion of how the attorney's
failures affected or prejudiced the defense may be irrelevant. If he can
present the omitted witnesses, he still may not win. 29 This is particu-
larly true if he must establish that these witnesses would have helped
him prove his innocence. The witnesses may not be credible or per-
suasive if they crumble under cross-examination or forget what had
occurred. 40
2. The trial attorney as witness: friend or enemy? The trial attor-
under Miranda for prosecution's case-in-chief held admissible for impeachment purposes)
with People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (under Cali-
fornia constitution statements obtained during custodial interrogation in violation of defen-
dant's right to remain silent inadmissible for impeachment purposes).
2 The argument would be that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should prevent the
government's use of the letter. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
n' Defendants have lost where they failed to show how their attorney's failure prejudiced
the defense. See, e.g., Toilette v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (defendant did not show how
attorney's failure to challenge composition or selection of grand jury made his guilty plea
involuntary or unintelligent); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (defendant failed to
show what his attorney would have done differently with more time to prepare); Angarano v.
United States, 312 A.2d 295 (D.C. 1973) (allegation of conflict of interest by counsel on motion
to withdraw insufficient; conflict must be explained). It is not clear in these cases whether the
defendant did not establish prejudice because he had no evidence of it, or because he did not
understand his burden. See United States ex rel. Rundle v. Green, 434 F.2d 1112, 1113 (3d
Cir. 1970).
For an excellent example of the record a defendant can make, see Brubaker v. Dickson, 310
F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) (evidence introduced of psychiatric defense that trial attorney failed to
present at trial).
12 Cf Wainwright v. Sykes, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2510 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The
defendant's opinion would be relevant where the attorney's failure affected the defendant's
decision to plea bargain, testify or waive a jury trial.
"I See notes 224-231 and accompanying text, supra.
240 Cf United States ex rel. Mandrier v. Hewitt, 409 F. Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (noting
difficulty of investigating adequacy of pre-trial preparation several years after the fact).
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ney usually testifies at the post-conviction hearing. Generally, he is
called as a government witness.24' His testimony may prove to be the
most difficult hurdle that the defendant will encounter. Recognition
and evaluation of the attorney's probable bias is essential to a judicial
determination of the trustworthiness of that testimony. On the other
hand, the defendant could call his trial attorney and ask whether, in
retrospect, he would have changed his tactics or recommendations in
any way, since he now knows exactly what he overlooked through his
failure to investigate. This question is relevant to establish impact
under DeCoster, and seems consistent with the universal desire not
to second-guess the attorney.
Courts fear that this kind of questioning invites collusion between
counsel and the defendant to fabricate a charge of ineffective repre-
sentation.' Rather, it is more likely that the attorney will be hostile
to his former client and attempt to defeat the charge through his
testimony.2 Obviously, the attorney would risk a great deal by
admitting anything that might constitute ineffective representation.
His client might sue him for malpractice; " the bar might institute
disciplinary proceedings against him; 45 his insurance company might
increase his malpractice insurance; judges might not appoint him to
represent indigents in the future; and prospective clients might choose
not to retain him. Thus, he has a powerful incentive to forget damag-
ing information, to shade his testimony, or even to lie. Many attor-
neys in this situation would recognize that the safest answer, whether
truthful or not, is to deny remembering anything about the alleged
basis of ineffectiveness.24 But they need not go so far; these attorneys
2,1 The government called the trial attorney in DeCoster. See also United States v. Hurt,
543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 429
U.S. 868 (1976); United States v. Moore, 529 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970).
"I See note 196, supra.
2,3 The one exception might be where the claim is based upon a belated appointment because
there the attorney's ability is not directly challenged. The attorney may be unable to establish
impact in such a case because he may not know what he could have discovered if he had more
time to prepare. Cf., United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1968)
(attorney could not say he had been insufficiently prepared to go to trial).
244 See Zelle & Stanhope, Lawyer Malpractice: The Boomerang Principle, Trial, June 1977,
at 16; Scott, Lawyers Who Sue Lawyers, New York Times Magazine, June 27, 1977, at 74.
But see Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976) (appointed attorney has immunity against
suits brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983); Case Comment, Standard for Effective Assistance of
Counsel, BAXTER V. ROSE, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975), 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 503, 508 n.23
(1977).
245 See McAleney v. United States, 539 F.2d 282 (Ist Cir. 1976) (suggesting disciplinary
proceedings if attorney intentionally misrepresented information to client); Holt v. State Bar
Grievance Bd., 388 Mich. 50, 199 N.W.2d 195 (1972) (ordering rehearing by grievance commit-
tee of claim that counsel not competent).
211 Whether truthful or not, many attorneys at evidentiary hearings have not remembered
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could explain that they proceeded as they did for tactical reasons or
that the omitted evidence would not have proven helpful.247
In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson,28 the attorney initially
explained that his client failed to testify at trial because the attorney
had erroneously believed the government would impeach the client
with his prior convictions. The attorney later contended somewhat
questionably that he feared his client would place his character in
evidence and expose himself to cross-examination about those prior
convictions if he had testified. 29 The district court considered this
explanation insufficient and found that the attorney's failure to have
his client testify, coupled with other omissions, constituted ineffective
representation. The Third Circuit reversed, however, because it found
that the attorney's tactics were within the range of competence ex-
pected of criminal attorneys.
In Thomas v. Wyrick,2 50 Frederick Brown confessed to murdering
a cab driver and named the defendant Thomas as his accomplice.
Thomas' defense attorney did not interview Brown and Brown did not
testify at Thomas' trial.251 Two years after Thomas' conviction,
Brown recanted his implication of Thomas, claiming he had lied to
protect the actual accomplices. After Brown testified at the eviden-
tiary hearing, the government called Thomas' trial attorney and
asked whether he would have called Brown as witness if he 'had
learned that Brown would repudiate his implication of Thomas. The
attorney testified that he would not have called Brown because
Brown's testimony would have shown that Thomas had been in the
cab. The government had only shown this point by circumstantial
evidence. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the claim of ineffec-
much about the defendant's case. This was true in DeCoster. See also United States ex rel.
Mandrier v. Hewitt, 409 F.Supp. 38, 44 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (attorney testified about his usual
procedures but. did not specifically remember defendant's case). Cf United States v. Simpson,
475 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (attorney had "at best an uncertain recollection [of] this
case").
247 See Franklin v. Wyrick, 529 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 962 (1977)
(attorney testified at post-conviction hearing that he decided, for tactical reasons, to point out
differences between coroner's testimony and government's opening statement in summation
rather than in cross-examination of coroner). The evidentiary hearing court should not pre-
sume the attorney acted for tactical reasons if he does not testify that he did. See, e.g., United
States v. Moore, 529 F.2d 355, 358 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
:0 531 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1977).
11 Id. at 175-76 & n. 17. The defendant had been convicted of two misdemeanors and one
felony and the attorney had not asked the court to rule on their use by the government.
2 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
n' The defendant also charged that his trial attorney had not interviewed other witnesses who
could have provided an alibi. Because those witnesses did not testify at the post-conviction




tive representation because it thought the attorney's explanation indi-
cated a sound tactical decision,"'2 but the Eighth Circuit decided that
the attorney had been ineffective. 53
Johnson and Thomas illustrate that the attorney's testimony may
be the biggest problem the defendant has in proving his claim. The
defendant cannot prevent his attorney from testifying by invoking the
attorney-client privilege. By challenging his attorney, he waives the
protection of that privilege. 54
But the scope of the defendant's waiver is not clear. Although the
attorney can testify about whatever is relevant or necessary to the
charge,25 courts should not interpret relevancy expansively. If the
defendant testifies that he received certain erroneous advice, the at-
torney can repeat what he actually said. If the defendant claims to
have given his attorney the names of witnesses, the attorney can
testify that the defendant did not do this. The attorney can also
explain why he made any tactical judgments. He could, for example,
testify that he urged his client to plead guilty because the defendant
had admitted guilt or that he did not investigate some source or
present some evidence in order to avoid exposing other criminal con-
duct by his client.2 .5
The government might try to reveal the defendant's admissions to
his attorney in order to prove harmless error or to rebut the defen-
dant's claim that he could have proven his innocence. Could the
government ask the attorney whether the defendant had ever admit-
ted either guilt or anything inconsistent with his testimony at the trial
or hearing? Or, could the government ask the attorney's opinion
about his client's guilt or the harm caused by the failure to
investigate?257 The attorney should be free to reveal his client's com-
252 Thomas v. State, 512 S.W.2d 116, 122 (1974).
"' The Eighth Circuit refused to accept the attorney's testimony that Brown would not have
helped as a witness. It disagreed with the district court's refusal to credit Brown's recantation,
and thought that the jury might have been affected had Brown testified.
I See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 12, 539 P.2d 556, 564 (1975); Morse v. Colorado,
180 Colo. 49, 55-56, 501 P.2d 1328, 1331 (1972); KAN. CIv. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-
426(b)(3)(Vernon 1965); ABA STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 103 at § 8.6(c);
FED. R. EVID. (proposed) 503(d)(3). If the defendant invokes the privilege, the attorney may
not testify, but the motion will be denied. See United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865,
873 (lst Cir. 1977).
2 5 The terms are used interchangeably, but if the test is "relevancy" rather than "necessity,"
the attorney should be permitted to testify to much more. Compare J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 503(d)(3)[011 (1975) (necessity) with Tasby v. United
States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) (relevancy).
25 See United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1975) (attorney exposed client's
psychiatric problems to show he had researched insanity defense but chose to present different
defense for tactical reasons).
" In United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the government asked the trial
1977]
158 THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
munications only insofar as they explain what the attorney did and
why he acted as he did.28 But once that evidence is known, the attor-
ney should not be permitted to comment on the strength of the gov-
ernment's or the defendant's case.2 59
3. Can the attorney's testimony be checked for accuracy? Ob-
viously, the trial attorney may testify honestly and fairly. There may
be no way, however, to ensure that he does. Neither artful defense
tactics nor an inspection of his file is likely to provide.the necessary
review.
(i) Tactics. The defendant's tactical problem is best illustrated
when he seeks habeas corpus review of a constitutional challenge
other than a claim of ineffective representation. The defendant might
have no tactical problem if he.could satisfy his burden by showing
that his attorney was unaware of a motion, that he thought it futile
to bring that motion, or that he was unaware that a procedural rule
barred making that motion later in the proceedings. But the defen-
dant probably must characterize those admissions by the attorney as
ineffective representation. 20 By joining a claim of ineffective repre-
sentation to the other constitutional claim, the defendant might trans-
form the attorney from a friendly witness to an adverse one. The
attorney could simply tailor his testimony to defeat both claims; for
example, he could easily say that he had considered the motion but
thought it futile or tactically inadvisable.26
To protect himself, the defendant might try to depose the attorney
before the hearing in order to lock him into a position, but in obtain-
ing the court's permission to take the attorney's deposition, the defen-
dant probably must explain his purpose. In so doing, he alerts the
trial attorney. Alternatively, the defendant might add a claim of
attorney how strong he thought the government's case was. Record of hearing at 28 (May I,
1974).
2" For example, DeCoster's trial attorney should not have been permitted to reveal his
client's letter because the letter did not explain why he had not investigated at the hotel or bar
at some point before he received it immediately before trial.
21' Even so, it will be difficult to prevent the attorney from indirectly commenting on his
client's guilt. In DeCoster, for example, during his testimony the attorney gratuitously men-
tioned that the trial judge had thought Eley's testimony had undercut the defense. Record, supra
note 50, at 55.
The prosecutor should not be allowed to comment because he has a conflict of interest in
wanting to protect the conviction. But cf. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 338-39 (S.D.
Tex. 1973) (prosecutor testified at evidentiary hearing that he would not have had defendant
testify).
'" The defendant may be required to argue ineffectiveness to avoid the procedural bars to
habeas corpus review. See notes 105-115 and accompanying text, supra.
"' See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 353 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (trial attorney's
testimony that he thought it futile to bring motion barred later review of issue on appeal).
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ineffective representation if the attorney's testimony at the hearing
reveals a basis for the claim. If his original hearing is in state court,
the defendant probably cannot add such a claim in federal habeas
corpus because he may have failed to exhaust state remedies. And
some appellate counsel will reject this strategy as unfair, especially
if the trial attorney had cooperated with appellate counsel.
(ii) Record keeping. The attorney might justify his failure to in-
vestigate, for example, by testifying that the defendant never gave
him the names of witnesses although the defendant claims he gave
this information. The court faces the problem of assessing the credi-
bility of the defendant and the attorney. This problem will arise most
frequently when there is no record of the disputed information. The
attorney may testify that his usual practice was to keep records of
this information and argue that the absence of a record indicates that
he never got certain information. 22 Courts usually treat the absence
of a record of information normally recorded as a hearsay exception,
probative of the fact that the event to be recorded did not occur.
Excluding this testimony is unfair to the attorney, but admitting it
may be unfair to the defendant since the attorney's self-serving testi-
mony cannot be verified.
The attorney may no longer have his file of the defendant's case,
if he ever kept one. 23 A careful attorney will document every conver-
sation he has with his client,24 but if he fears he might be challenged
"I See, e.g., Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 722 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976) (attorney did not
remember specific case and testified about usual practice); Shuman v. Peyton, 361 F.2d 646,
648 (4th Cir. 1966) (attorney explained usual investigative practice); United States ex el.
Mandrier v. Hewitt, 409 F. Supp. 38, 45 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (attorney usually asked for continu-
ance if he needed time to prepare).
213 Appellate counsel may also be forced to subpoena that file, if trial counsel claims that
the attorney-client privilege bars him from releasing it. DeCoster's trial counsel, for example,
claimed that that privilege barred him from releasing the defendant's letter to appellate counsel.
Record, supra note 50, at 3. Because the privilege protects the defendant rather than the
attorney, if the defendant waives the privilege, the trial counsel should comply with the request.
An unexplored question is the effect of the work product doctrine. The defendant should not
be able to invoke that doctrine to prevent trial counsel from using relevant information to
protect himself. Cf Duplan Corp. v. Moulinageet Ratorderie De Citavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 483-
84 (4th Cir. 1973) (work product privilege designed to protect attorney). The attorney probably
cannot invoke the doctrine to bar the defendant's attempt to discover whether the attorney has
information, such as a list of witnesses defendant claims to have given him. Nor should the
defendant be able to invoke the doctrine to prevent the government from discovering the file,
at least whenever the attorney also wants to use that information sought to protect himself.
"I Or, he might file an explanation with the court of why he did or did not do something.
See United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (attorney filed unsworn
statement explaining why he did not cross-examine a key witness); Taylor v. Alabama, 291 Ala.
760, 287 So. 2d 901 (1973) (trial court urged attorney to record reasons why he followed
defendant's desire in conflict concerning defense trial tactics; defendant filed motion for new
trial on ground that attorney should have overriden defendant's desire).
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at some future point, he might choose not to keep notes of conversa-
tions with his clients or other witnesses. He might routinely destroy
his files once his representation is over, or dispose of his notes if his
client claims ineffective representation." 5
4. The attitude of the judiciary. Many judges do not view claims
of ineffective representation with favor and are reluctant to brand any
attorney as ineffective. 6 Judges may suspect that every disgruntled
defendant will challenge his attorney,2 7 that appellate counsel fail to
understand the nature of trial practice and irresponsibly accept the
defendant's charge, 28 or that ineffectiveness claims implicitly accuse
the trial judge with failing to oversee the trial.
This attitude is reflected in the way in which some judges treat trial
counsel at the evidentiary hearing and evaluate the evidence counsel
submits. 2 9 Judges will allow counsel to remain in the courtroom while
other witnesses testify, and have accepted affidavits without requiring
the attorney affiant to testify.270 No court has decided recently
whether the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation ap-
On the other hand, one trial attorney testified that he kept no notes of any conversation he
had with witnesses to prevent the notes from "fall[ing] into the wrong hands." United States
v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976), record of hearing at 49-50 (May 1, 1974).
205 The voucher prepared by an appointed attorney to receive compensation would not pro-
vide an effective way to review the accuracy of his testimony at the hearing. Because the
attorney would not indicate in the voucher why he did not do something or what his client had
not told him, he could explain at the hearing why he did not make some motion or deny that
his client had mentioned a witness. Some appointed attorneys do not even prepare vouchers
because they waive payment. See Austern-Reznick Report, supra n.121 at 18.
"I See United States v. Heard, 419 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Bazelon, The
Realities, supra, note 9, at 822 (criticizing judges' reluctance "to soil the reputation" of attor-
neys by finding them ineffective).
2"7 See United States v. Joyce, 542 F.2d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 1976) ("A convicted defendant is
a dissatisfied client, and the very fact of his conviction will seem to him proof positive of his
counsel's ineffectiveness), quoting United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963).
See also Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied. 372 U.S. 978 (1963);
Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958);
Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 708 app. (W.D. Mo. 1976).
2I" For example, at the evidentiary hearing in United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.
1976), the hearing judge, characterizing the question as "impertinent," asked appellate counsel
how many criminal trials he had tried. His answer was none. Transcript of hearing at 82 (May
I, 1974). See also United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (appellate
counsel is "insulateldl . ..from responsibility for the decisions of trial counsel"); Weather-
all v. State of Wisconsin, 73 Wis.2d 22, 25, 242 N.W.2d 220, 222 (1976) (appellate counsel
always tempted to substitute his judgment for that of trial counsel).
2"' See. e.g.. United States v. Matthews, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975) (court presumed
attorney was aware of his duties and that he sought conscientiously to discharge them), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
270 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 273 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brubaker
v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 35 n.24 (9th Cir. 1962); SECTION 2254 RULES, supra note 221 at 7(b)
& (c).
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plies at the post-conviction hearing."' Since habeas proceedings are
considered a hybrid of criminal and civil proceedings,"' that right
may not apply. But courts should rarely accept affidavits in place of
live testimony if a hearing is held.7 In an affidavit, the attorney
could rationalize his conduct or omit damaging information too eas-
ily.274 He should be required to testify because his credibility is fre-
quently the crucial issue.2
Courts have also relaxed other evidentiary requirements. They
have, for example, used character evidence to infer how the attorney
usually represents his clients.2 7 But the attorney's character is not in
issue and evidence of those factors should be irrelevant; the question
is not how the attorney usually acts, but whether he effectively repre-
sented the particular defendant who challenges him.
VII. WHAT CAN COURTS Do?
If courts decide to oversee defense representation, they could begin
by explaining the attorney's obligations to counsel and to the defen-
dant early in the proceedings2" Then, at another point before trial, 278
" See Irvin v. Zerbst, 97 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1938) (admitting affidavits and holding confron-
tation clause inapplicable because habeas corpus proceedings not a criminal trial). The confron-
tation clause might apply if the defendant were to challenge his attorney's representation
through Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because that motion might be
considered part of the criminal proceeding.
27 See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
2 See McAleney v. United States, 539 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1976).
2 See United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (attorney filed unsworn
statement with trial court following guilty verdict in apparent attempt to explain decision not
to interview or cross-examine key government witness. In dissent, Bazelon, C.J., thought
attorney's decision was uninformed because the witness had not been interviewed).
m' See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, No. 74-531 (D.D.C. May 4, 1976), appeal dismissed,
No. 76-1498 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 1976), (jail records indicated counsel had not interviewed client
as frequently as he claimed; district court reversed conviction even though defendant failed to
show prejudice from failure to interview). Cooper suggests that courts may reverse to uphold
the appearance of justice where the attorney has apparently lied or shaded his testimony.
2" See FED. R. EVID. 404. Courts have bolstered the credibility of the trial attorney by
considering his past reputation, Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Tenn. 1975) (two attor-
neys enjoyed "exemplary professional reputation and normally practiceld] before the trial judge
who most assuredly knows their reputation . . ."), his listing in MARTINDALE-HUBBELL,
United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 n. 2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975),
his extensive trial experience, Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186, 1191 (3d Cir. 1969) (trial
attorney described as "an attorney of great experience in the trial of criminal cases."), affd,
399 U.S. 42 (1970), and the extent of his practice, see United States v. Matthews, 518 F.2d
1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975) (attorneys "who are the busiest and under greatest pressure often
perform with greatest skill, diligence and effectiveness").
21 This assumes that the court adopts and interprets guidelines like the ABA standards to
define the defense attorney's role. Cf. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 457-58 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (court instructs psychiatrist about role as a witness when defense is insanity). Most
judges and attorneys would not be pleased to educate the defendant, because he might then
object to counsel's decisions. If he objects, the court must decide the fundamental issue of
whether he, or his attorney, controls trial tactics.
"0 If the defendant pleads guilty, the court should also require counsel to explain his prepara-
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a judge could ask the attorney to explain his preparation, and ask the
defendant whether he was satisfied with his attorney's representa-
tion.29 The attorney could reply in either a conference with the judge
or by completing a checklist.
This simple approach has several benefits. It applies to retained
and appointed counsel. 280 It provides a record of what the attorney
did and why he did not do something.28' And, it avoids the problem
of whether the power to appoint and discipline attorneys should be
transferred from the judiciary to some independent entity.2 82
tion and his decision not to make some motion or not to proceed to trial. This requirement
could be part of the judge's inquiry under Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
If the judge does not demand that explanation, the guilty plea will almost surely bar the
defendant from any later attack on his attorney's failure to make some motion, like a motion
to suppress, even if the attorney's decision was clearly wrong. See McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970).
21 See Bazelon, The Realities, supra note 9 at 831 and Defective Assistance, supra note 9
at 40 (similar suggestion but not explaining its implementation); Grano, The Right to Counsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1248 (1970) (suggesting that
attorney need not testify at the post-conviction hearing if he completed a checklist). See also
United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (in dictum, Bazelon, C.J., suggested
that counsel should explain his preparation to the judge); United States v. Simpson, 475 F.2d
934, 939-42 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Bazelon, C.J., in dissent, set out a form that the attorney
could complete to indicate his preparation whenever the defendant pleaded guilty), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973).
"' This approach may provide the only possible form of oversight over retained counsel,
whom the defendant has a right to choose, even if the court thinks that counsel is inept or
inexperienced. See Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547,440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. I (1968).
211 A requirement that the attorney explain why he did not do something would eliminate
the difficult problem for the post-conviction court of assessing a conflict between counsel and
defendant over what counsel had told his client. Because that requirement might also force the
attorney to consider what he should do, it may be the only effective way to improve defense
representation.
2 More extensive reform is possible, at least with appointed counsel. Courts could establish
qualification tests for attorneys who sought appointments. They might refuse to appoint those
attorneys who frequently performed questionably. And they might relinquish the power to
qualify, select and discipline attorneys to an independent authority. Each of these reforms will
generally improve defense representation, but none will guarantee that an individual defendant
is represented effectively, as the proposal suggested here is designed to do. Of these three
reforms, the first is the most likely to be adopted. A federal task force is currently examining
whether the federal courts should establish standards that an attorney must meet to qualify to
receive appointments. See note 13, supra.
The second and third reforms are not likely to be adopted. Judges are reluctant to remove
an appointed attorney from a case, or to bar him from receiving other appointments, without
clear standards governing how attorneys should represent their clients. Many judges will also
refuse to deprive an attorney of appointments, no matter how inept he is, if appointments are
an important source of income for him. (Chief Judge Harold Greene of the District of Columbia
Superior Court made this argument while commenting on proposed changes in the appointment
process. Letter to Bernice Just, Feb. 17, 1977, at 3; copy available from author.) As long as
judges control appointments, the process of disciplining or removing an attorney from a case
will be chaotic. In one recent case, for example, a judge in the District of Columbia removed
two appointed attorneys for incompetency, and granted a new trial as a result. The second
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The checklist probably involves fewer problems than the confer-
ence. A conference between judge, attorney and defendant might
intrude on the attorney-client relationship and consume too much
time and money. For example, courts might balk at scheduling a
calendar date for a conference, or at compensating an appointed
attorney for attending that conference. They may also be wary of
inviting the defendant into chambers.1 3
Many attorneys would consider the conference demeaning and
would justifiably fear giving information to the judge because it might
affect that judge's rulings at trial and his evaluation of the testimony
or the defendant's guilt. And, the defendant would probably have to
waive the attorney-client privilege. An attorney could find himself in
judge, to whom the case was reassigned, reappointed the attorneys. THE WASHINGTON STAR,
May I, 1977, at F-5, col. 2.
Few judges are ready to transfer their power over appointments. In 1975, a report prepared
by a committee established by the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and a local bar association recommended the creation of an umbrella organization to
control the appointment process. Austern-Reznick Report, supra note 121. Although most
sections of the bar endorsed that recommendation, the Superior Court refused to adopt it and
created a "cadre" system of several lawyers, chosen by the judges, who would represent up to
eight new defendants each day from their initial appearance through indictment. The court
adopted the "cadre" system without holding hearings, and in the face of almost unanimous
opposition from the bar. It is too early to assess whether the "cadre" system will improve
defense representation. Compare the initial report prepared by the Criminal Justice Act
Committee, Aug. 18, 1977 (in favor of the "cadre" system) with the "Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee to Evaluate the Cadre System of Division V of the D.C. Bar," October, 1977
(generally criticizing the system) (copies of both reports available from the author).
The "cadre" system represents the worst approach to the problem of improving defense
representation, because a new attorney is appointed to replace the "cadre" attorney after
indictment. This system divides the responsibility between attorneys and increases judicial
control. The crucial time to consult and investigate is usually immediately after the defendant's
arrest. Because the "cadre" attorney will not represent the defendant after the indictment, he
may have little incentive to begin immediate preparation of the defense. See also Just, "The
Accused Shall Enjoy . . .Assistance of Counsel?" I District Lawyer, No. 4, p. 48 (Summer,
1977). Compare Temple, "The Cadre Plan: No Help to the Accused," id. at 51, wIth Murray,
"A Re-Examination of the Cadre Plan," ibid., Vol. 2, No. i, p. 48 (Fall, 1977).
The threat of discipline for ineffective representation may goad attorneys in general to
improve their counseling, but it may not help an individual defendant who is upset by counsel's
performance. In the District of Columbia, for example, a defendant may be reluctant to
complain because he must address his complaint to the judge assigned his case. If the judge
cannot resolve the dispute, he can refer it to a disciplinary board. That board, however, refuses
to review the matter because of the attorney-client privilege until the attorney either withdraws
or is removed. That seems to be an inadequate reason for non-intervention because a defendant
who complains would undoubtedly be willing to waive the protection of the privilege. If the
defendant appeals his conviction on the ground of ineffective representation, the board also
delays review until the appellate court decides the issue. See Gribbon, "Disciplinary Board on
Complaints Against CJA Attorneys," 2 District Lawyer No. 1, p. 47 (Fall 1977). As a result,
the grievance process is not likely to help the individual defendant receive better representation.
2 A practical reason to hold the conference in chambers is the impracticality of clearing
the courtroom of everyone but the defendant and the attorney in any jurisdiction where the
volume of cases is high, and a number of conferences are scheduled for the same time.
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the dilemma of being forced to answer the court's questions when he
thinks that it is better that his client not waive the privilege.24 That
fear might also lead an attorney never to ask for a bench trial before
the judge who presided at the hearing.
To avoid influencing the trial judge, a different judge could speak
with the attorney at the conference. But that solution would be cum-
bersome in jurisdictions where the dockets are already overcrowded.
And, a specially-assigned judge might not easily provide the neces-
sary review if he knew little about the case.
Courts could use a checklist to provide the same protection for a
defendant. The attorney could complete a form in which he indicated
what he had and had not done, and what he expected to do. 5 The
defendant would review the form; if he disagreed, he could object to
the judge. By objecting, he would waive the attorney-client privilege.
If he did not object, the attorney-client privilege problem would dis-
appear, because neither the judge nor prosecutor would see the form.
The form could be reviewed only by a post-conviction court if the
defendant appealed on the ground of ineffective representation.
Whether the checklist or conference is adopted, one point is
clear-review must precede the trial. Only pretrial review will force
the attorney to prepare and will deny him the opportunity to rational-
ize why he failed to do something. Perhaps the attorney should also
complete a second form or have a second conference with a judge
m The defendant could abort the conference by refusing to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege. The court might have trouble protecting the defendant against the attorney's advice not
to waive the privilege when the attorney was actually trying to protect himself against exposing
what little he had done.
It may be difficult to decide whether certain information is covered by the privilege. Wit-
nesses whom the attorney learned of through discovery from the government would not be
covered. But witnesses whom the defendant named, or whom the attorney found based on
information from the defendant, might be covered.
m The checklist would follow the ABA guidelines and could include the following questions:
1. Investigation.
a. Have you obtained discovery from the government? If not, why not? What
have you received through discovery?
b. Have you investigated at the scene of the alleged crime? If not, why not?
c. What witnesses have you spoken to? What witnesses do you intend to speak
to? If there are potential witnesses whom you have decided not to speak to, why did
you make that decision?
2. Motions.
a. What motions have you made?
b. Have you made all motions you consider relevant and helpful?
c. Did you consider, but decide not to make, some motion? If so, what was that
motion(s) and what prompted your decision?
3. Consultation.
How many times have you spoken to your client? Are you satisfied that these




immediately before the trial begins, or before both sides rest their
cases. The second review would require the attorney to document his
recognition and treatment of any further problems.
There are problems with either method of monitoring attorneys.
Some attorneys might refuse criminal cases because they found this
intrusion into their practices unjustified. The judge must decide what
he can do if the defendant and attorney disagree about some aspect
of the attorney's representation. The judge probably is powerless, for
example, to order the attorney to investigate; that is a decision within
the attorney's discretion. On the other hand, the judge might replace
an appointed attorney who refused to perform some duty provided
by the guidelines. But, in resolving any dispute between attorney and
defendant, the judge will probably learn the very information that the
use of a checklist is designed to avoid. To prevent that, and thereby
to provide complete protection for the defendant, an independent
committee could review the dispute or even conduct the initial confer-
ence with the defense. 28
VIII. CONCLUSION
The post-conviction process is not designed to improve defense
representation. The standard of review is not settled, the problem of
raising the issue is too great, the record of what the attorney did is
frequently incomplete, and the remedy of reversal is not directed at
the defense attorney.
DeCoster is the best judicial attempt to improve defense represen-
tation through the post-conviction process. But that decision moves
against the force of recent Supreme Court cases, and is not likely to
survive en banc review.2 7 Even if adopted, DeCoster's standard will
improve defense representation only if trial courts try to police the
defense attorney. They can do that by adopting the ABA guidelines
and by asking the attorney what he did to prepare. Unless courts are
willing to police the attorney, they should candidly admit that the call
for "effective representation" is simply rhetoric.
But the problems of staffing that body and of deciding its power and accountability make
its creation and operation impractical. The fact that the proposal suggested in this article for
pretrial judicial review of the attorney's representation by conference or checklist is not perfect
should not undercut its value.
"' If the en banc court decides to reverse, hopefully it will do so on the narrow ground that
there was no factual basis to trigger the use of the presumption, or that the trial attorney's
failures were harmless error. On either ground, the three-part standard establishing the burden
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